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The man-machine automation trade-off methodology presented in this
report is one of four research tasks comprising the Autonomous Spacecraft
System Technology (ASST) project at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. ASST,
funded under a National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Office of
Aeronautics and Space Technology) Research Technology Objectives Plan, was
established to identify and study system-level design problems for autonomous
spacecraft. Using the Space Station as an example spacecraft system requiring
a certain level of autonomous control, a system-level, man-machine automation
trade-off methodology is presented that (1) optimizes man-machine mixes for
different ground and on-orbit crew functions subject to cost, safety, weight,
power, and reliability constraints and (2) plots the best incorporation plan
for new, emerging technologies by weighing cost, relative availability,
reliability, safety, importance to out-year missions, and ease of retrofit.
While the methodology takes a fairly straightforward approach to valuing
human productivity, it is still sensitive to the important subtleties
associated with designing a well-integrated, man-machine system. These
subtleties include considerations such as crew preference to retain certain
spacecraft control functions; or valuing human integration/decision
capabilities over equivalent hardware/software where appropriate. Quanti-
tatively, the methodology incorporates these considerations by reflecting a
large, and perhaps uneconomical, investment in replacement automation.
Rudimentary examples are provided throughout the report to clarify the
man-machine and technology trade-off processes. The methodology, representing
the results of the first phase of research for the Man-Machine Trade-off Task,
is succeeded by recommendations for follow-on research, primarily in the area
of database construction for the model.
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FOREWORD
This report provides the results of the first phase of development of a
Space Station autonomy and automation methodology for (1) identifying optimum
man-machine mixes for both on-orbit and ground-crew functions and (2) plotting
the beat technology growth path for out-year retrofit toward greater autonomy.
This study is part of the NASA-funded (Office of Aeronautics and Space
Technology) Autonomous Spacecraft System Technology, RTOP 506-64-15.
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DEFINITION OF TERMS
	
AAF
	
Adaptation Adjustment Factor
	
ADSI
	
Adapted number of Delivered Source Instructions (this is the
original DSI figure)
	
akt	 identified man-machine alternative, t, for a given subsystem, k
	
Bkt	 net benefit from automating subsystem, k, with alternative, t.
This net benefit is made up of the benefit from manhours saved,
Mkt , and other incremental net dollar benefits, ckt [i.e.,
(Mkt + ckt)]
	
C	 cost of the most expensive man-machine alternative (i.e., that
alternative in which all functions are to be automated)
	
CF	cost of facilities, such as building space, computers, and
ground-crew displays
	
C I	initial incremental cost associated with automating subsystem, i
	
Ckt	 net subsystem, k, cost not considering the benefit of automating
alternative, t
	
CLC	 incremental life-cycle cost associated with automating subsystem,
i, for a given man-machine alternative
	
CLSTE	 cost of launch support and test equipment (launch support refers
to consideration of launch weight constraints, and test equipment
refers to special test, verification, calibration or tooling
hardware)
	
CM	 % Code Modified
	
CM	cost of maintenance (primarily the recurring retrofit and ground
maintenance costs associated with the repair of failed components
and associated software)
	
CMp	 cost of on-orbit and ground manpower; on-orbit workforce costs are
reduced by the value of crew hours saved, and ground workforce is
composed of system-maintenance/support for test and mission-
control personnel
	
COS	 incremental operations and support (recurring) costs associated
with automating subsystem, i
	
CRDP	 cost of R&D and production; this cost includes the hardware,
software, communication, and additional sensor elements
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INN
	CS	 cost of initial and follow-on spares
	
CSTE	 cost of support and test equipment, exclusive of CLSTE
	
CT	cost target for the total system
	
CTD	 cost of supporting technical documentation for training or
maintenance
	
CTR	 cost of on-orbit and ground-crew training if subsystem functions
not completely automated
	
C(x)
	
net incremental life-cycle cost for automating function, i
	
DM	 % Design Modified
	
EDSI
	
Expected number of Delivered Source Instructions
	
Hkt	 incremental hazard exposure time reduction due to automating
subsystem, k, with alternative, t
k master scaling constant that is an algebraic function of the
ki's,	 scaling u(x) from u = 0.0 to u = 1.0
ki scaling constant ranging between 0.0 and 1.0 that determines the
it
	 or "importance" of the ith attribute
IM % Integration required for Modified software
Mkt crew manhour (workhour) savings associated with a given
man-machine alternative, t,	 for a given subsystem, k
	
n	 number of attributes
	
P	 incremental crew hours saved if function i is automated
	
11	 symbol for the "product" of n expressions
	
Pkt	 incremental power impact of automating subsystem, k, with
alternative, t
	
PT	 system-level power constraint
	
ui(xi)	 attribute utility function of the ith attribute
	
U(X)
	
outcome utility function
	
Wkt	incremental weight impact of automating subsystem, k, with
alternative, t
	
WT	 system-level weight constraint
	
x	 automation decision variable for function i having a value of 1 if
the function is automated and 0 if the function is not
vi
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SECTION I
INTRODUCTTON AND SUMMARY
A. OBJECTIVES
The Autonomous Spacecraft System Technology (ASST) effort at the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) was established tv carry out system-level design
analysis for unmanned and manned autonomous; spacecraft control, with applica-
tion to Space Station. Although the size and complexity of the Space Station
are important design considerations that favo-.- a larger degree of automation
4	
and autonomy than current unmanned or manned spacecraft, an even larger design
driver is the mission d : iersi. y. Present Space Station mission concepts
include a Isrge array of scientific experiments, possible manufacturing
processes involving pharmaceuticals or alloys, cnd communications. Therefore,
productive crew time will be an extremely important resource. Additionally,
the planned long life for Space Station implies (1) an expansion of mission
conceits (in both number and sophistication) and (2) long-term involvement of
i	 on-orbit and ground-crew resources. A combination of greater demands on both
Space Station and ground crews and long-term commitment of manpower and
associated ground support suggests a potential for significant cost savings
through automation and greater autonomy from ground control. Consequently,
the objective of this study was to develop a trade-off methodology that would
(1) provide the optimal man-machine mixes for different crew functions and
#	 (2) plot the best incorporation plan for new, emerging technologies from the
}	 standpoint of both cost and benefits received. Although the study is sensi-
tive to human-factor design considerations (such as the inherent advantages of
human integration and decision-making capabilities for certain multi-variable
problems), it is outside the scope of this study to explore psychological or
motivational dimensions of the man-machine functional allocation problem.
	 !'
Nevertheless, the methodology is designed to allow additional functional
selection criteria to be incorporated at a later date. it is anticipated that
this methodology will be used as a system design tool by spacecraft (and.
specifically, Space Station) project management.
B. TASK BACKGROUND
The JPL involvement in earth-orbiting spacecraft autonomy began in the
summer of 1980 with a workshop sponsored by the U.S. Air Force Office of
Scientific Research involving industry and members of the academic community.
The objective was to define the concepts and technology needed to increase the
automation of spacecraft operation and reduce dependence on ground control.
This initial effort led to the establishment of the Autonomous Spacecraft
Program (ASP) at JPL. Although not linked to the ASST program, ASP arovided
an excellent knowledge base for the follow-up ASST effort. The JPL ASST
effort, funded by the Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology (OAST) at
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Headquarters, is divided
into the following four major research areas:
(1) Architectural concepts for autonomous control.
(2) h n-aachine trade-off methodology.
1-1
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(3) Expert systems-implementation methodology.
(4) Autonomous-control software technology.
For this first research phase, the man-machine trade-off element of the
effort was designed primarily to develop a methodology framework for the
cost-benefit assessment, provide rudimentary example applications of the
methodology, and establish follow-on research priorities.
C.	 ASSUMPTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS
Although several different types of modeling approaches are used to
establish the structure for the automation cost-benefit model, the final
rankings of man-machine mixes and technology growth options will be based
primarily on cost, crew-productivity impacts, crew safety, and their import-
ance relative to meeting mission requirements. Two of the major underlying
assumptions of this approach are that (1) automation and an increasing degree
of autonomy are programmatic goals needed to meet anticipated mission demands
and (2) extensive total automation and autonomous control of the Space
Station, while perhaps technically feasible at this time, may not be
economically practical.
At a more detailed level (within the model framework itself) it was
necessary to establish a standard on-orbit operating baseline against which
improvements in performance due to automation could be compared. It was
assumed that (1) Skylab and Space Shuttle on-orbit operations were represen-
tative of the operational baseline and (2) baseline equipment functions,
associated crew task/cost data (respectively obtained from operational logs
and Shuttle operations planning personnel), as well as Space Station subsystem 	 It
cost estimates had either a sound historical or theoretical basis. Further-
more, it was assumed that the kinds of cn-orbit and ground-crew tasks
associated with programs such as Skylab and Shuttle were generic kinds of
tasks also required for Space Station. For purposes of costing, a 20-year
life cycle was also assumed.
One last aspect of the automation cost-benefit assessment model frame-
work refers to the aptimization portions of the methodology. Several differ-
ent cost and design variables having different values, depending on the man-
machine mix or technology selected, must be weighed. As part of the optimiza-
tion process it was assumed that some variables (such as cost or safety) could
be more important design drivers than other variables (such as research and
development time). In conjunction with this assumption, it was also assumed
that sufficient expertise and experience exists in the government and private
sector to allow appropriate weights to be assigned to the variables.
Several constraints generated from Space Station programmatic develop-
ments and schedule limitations. Programmatically speaking, the man-machine
trade-off task was initiated during the pre-program Space Station Conceptual
Design Group (CDG) effort. Although basic design requirements were available
at that time, neither the requirements nor the overall configuration was well-
defined. Even with the Skylab and Shuttle experience, this lack of definition
made it difficult to formulate the system-operating baseline referred to
earlier in this section. As a result, the operations and functions (and
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supporting functional task-time data) were developed at a generic level and
designed to allow tailoring as detailed crew operational scenarios become
available later in the program. This approach was reasonable in view of the
fact that the Space Station program, having just been initiated, requires only
approximate coat-benefit- estimates. Another programmatic constraint was
generated after the task began, and the Johnson Space Center (.ISC) Space
Station system requirements effort had been started. Once the requirements
effort had begun, some reference configurations and mission descriptions
became available. In an effort to keep the thrust of the ASST man-machine
trade-off study jointly in line with the overall Space Station program, it was
decided to deviate slightly from the more general nature of the basic ASST
Research Technology Objectives Plan (RTOP) and center on the design and
opt	
mission scenarios generated by the JSC requirements effort.
The last constraint revolved around meeting the task-deliverable schedule.
Originally, the task was structured so that the methodology would be demonstrated
on some example conceptual designs. However, other prci aromatic demands on the
conceptual design group caused a delay in the concept generation. Subsequently,
it was not feasible to do the concept costing and cost-benefit projections as
originally planned. Therefore, the task was restructured to a confirmation that
the technique could be developed, coupled with a demonstration of the technique
where conceptual design data were available.
D.	 SUMMARY OF APPROACH AND RESULTS
Several steps are required to identify potential areas for ;utomation,
establish strawman conceptual designs for costing, weigh automation cost
against other design and system cost attributes, and establish the benefits of
automation, namely:
(1) Network analysis (identification and mapping of crew functions).
(2) Conceptual design and costing.
(3) Det , :mination of a most likely set of man-machine alternatives.
(4) Measure of cost, productivity, and safety impacts of design and
cost attributes.
(5) Selection of optimal (high-value) man-machine alternatives.
(6) Optimization of man-machine mixes for the complete system.
(7) Rank ordering of technology options.
Figure 1-1 shows an overview of the complete methodology.
•
I.	 Network Analysis
As mentioned earlier in this section, Space Station functional
task networks were extrapolated from Skylab and Shuttle operational logs and
conversations with the Shuttle Operations Group at JSC.
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Figure 1-1. Man-Machine Trade-Oft Methodolcgy Structure
For the purpose of focusing the study effort, it was decided to select
two (of the approximate 8 or 10) Space Station modules that represented areas
in which major man-machine trade--offs might be rcyuired. This was done by
interviewing individuals knowledgeable in both the manned-spacecraft and Space
Stetion arenas. Ultimately, the rower and command control modules were
selected. Keeping crew productivity as a r:ajor design driver in mind, the
functional task networks were crucial to underV anding (1) the tasks normally
performed by the crew; (2) which key tasks, when automated, might have major
impacts on streamlining the operaticn of the spacecraft anc freeing the crew
to handle more payloads (for example, experiments); and (3) potential exposure
to hazards.
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2. Conceptual Design and Costing
Once the key automation areas are identified, the next major step
is to establish conceptual designs of the automation candidates. The purpose
of the conceptual design effort is threefold: (1) identify additional
hardware required for automation, (2) identify additional automation software,
and (3) estimate the additional cost for automation. One important fallout of
the conceptual design step that became apparent from one of the test examples
was the identification of economies of scale (that is, the sharing of
automation components between subsystems). As the model is refined and the
conceptual design database is expanded, it will become easier to understand
ways of conserving system costs through economies of scale.
Once the network and conceptual design steps are completed, an initial
subset of man-machine mixes can be isolated in terms of the two major design
drivers, productivity and cost. This is done by selecting those mixes that
have the most favorable increase in productivity for a given cost. Other
mixes that give smaller returns for the same, or greater, cost are then
considered less desirable alternatives. This process allows a large array of
various man-machine alternatives to be trimmed to an "efficient" subset. An
example is provided in Section V.
3. Attribute Measures
Clearly, as costs and benefits of automation are examined, the
crew productivity and automation cost elements described above are important
attributes. Particular attention is paid to identifying not only an
economically efficient but well-integrated combination of man-machine
resources. Other attributes such as safety, weight, power, reliability, and
research and development (R&D) risk are also important design and cost
drivers. Because safety is not easily costed and not directly related to
productivity, it was decided to apply either a subjective or "reduction in
hazard exposure time" measure. The weight and power attributes were basically
treated as constraints measured against an allowable deviation above a
baseliae operating mode. Both have launch cost impacts, while power also has
life-cycle cost impacts. Reliability has both productivity and cost impacts.
The productivity impact is related to the possible extension in mean time
between repair actions while the cost impacts are associated with (1) building
in test and verification hardware/software (a launch cost impact);
(2) potentially lower operations and maintenance costs caused by lengthening
the period between spare stockage (or requiring less in-place redundancy); and
(3) developing a more efficient, spare procurement philosophy (a life-cycle
impact). Other life-cycle reliability cost aspects include manpower and
training. The last attribute, R&D risk, has Cwo facets. From a reliability
aspect it can add to the automation cost if it is necessary to spend more
money for in-place spares to make up for lower reliability of new, or
extensions of existing, technology (both launch and life-cycle cost impacts).
In the case of advanced, or future, technology the R&D risk attribute is
measured in terms of the amount of time before the technology is qualified and
becomes available. This last facet is considered when advanced technologies
are factored into the cost-benefit analysis and the design.
°L
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4.	 Cost-Benefit Analysis
For each man-machine alternative identified in the efficient
subset, the present-value costs (both costs and savings) are melded together
to form a "net cost-benefit." Similarly, the productivity impacts are
combined to form a single productivity figure. The safety impact remains
independent. The actual cost-benefit analysis encompasses items (4), (5), and
(6) listed at the beginning of Section I-D. Even though it is understood that
a dollar value could be placed on crew productivity in terms of the cost of
having an astronaut in space, it is not clear at this time that this is an
appropriate measure. A more appropriate, and perhaps more valuable, measure
might be the value of additional experiments, or profits realized, by having
more productivity time on orbit. Therefore, until a better measure is
obtained, the productivity impacts are assumed to be an independent benefit
from the net cost-benefits. However, in so doing, the model structure is left
with providing a means of selecting the best man-machine mixes for each
subsystem and module, based on all three cost, productivity, and safety
attributes. As an intermediate solution, a multi-attribute decision approach
was developed. Basically, multi-attribute decision analysis is employed when
the outcome of a decision involving a complex system (such as selecting an
ideal man-machine mix for Space Station) ivivolves several criteria. Decision
makers (experts in the manned-spacecraft arena) are asked to place weights on
the various criteria, or attributes. Based on the relative weights obtained
from the decision makers, preference values are computed for each attribute so
the trade-offs between the various outcomes can be made and the outcomes
ranked to express accurately the preferences of the decision makers. In this
same manner a small preferred set of man-machine alternatives (outcomes) is
selected for each subsystem and module in the Space Station system.
At the completion of the subsystem cost-benefit assessment and selection
of optimal man-machine mix, the problem is still only half-solved. The best
combination(s) of man-machine alternatives must be chosen across all sub-
systems and modules. To do this step a standard life-cycle cost algorithm is
employed along with a cost target. This calculation determines which set of
man-machine mixes reduces the total system cost the most, thereby either
meeting or bettering the cost target or minimizing the difference between the
actual and target costs.
The last step in the trade-off analysis considers the incorporation of
future technologies that may not be available or mature by the intended 1992
Space Station launch date. In this last step various technologies applicable
to each automation function are assigned respective quantitative and
subjective values for each of ten attributes. Seven of the attributes (IOC
and life-cycle cost, safety, power, weight, workhour savings, and reliability)
are the same as used earlier for the man-machine mix optimization. Three
other attributes (R&D risk, technology importance as related to meeting
potential out-year mission requirements, and retrofit amenability) were added
because they complete the decision environment in which managers and budget
planners will make technology selections. Again, employing multi-attribute
decision theory and weighting the relative importance of each attribute, the
various technology options are ranked, based on how well each option
ultimately compares with others relative to the attribute measures. In this
manner an evolutionary improvement program is developed.
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5.	 Summary of Results
Because this initial research effort dealt more with the design
structure of the trade-off methodology than with actual design projections,
the results to date are more theoretical and qualitative than quantitative.
Nevertheless, the results suggest good promise for being able to develop a
reasonable, practical, automation/autonomy design tool. The primary result is
that an appropriate man-machine automation trade-off methodology was
developed. As a measure of the practicality of the methodology, the research
strongly indicates that data do exist to support the various analytical steps
in the technique. These practical aspects of the research are stated in
Table 1-1.
E.	 REPORT STRUCTURE
In this report the background leading to the study definition is
provided in Section II, along with a summary of other recent, associated
automation studies. Section III provides an overview of the methodology
framework. Sections IV through VII explain each element of the methodology in
depth with some examples, where data were available. Finally, Section VIII
summarizes the research results to date and defines recommendations for
follow-on studies.
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Table 1-1. Space Station Man-Machine Automation Trade-off Study Results
(Phase I)
Phase I Study Results in Terms of Data
Quality/Availability
Methodology Area	 Good	 Reasonable Unknown at this
Stage
XCapability to develop represen-
tative on-orbit crew functional
task networks
Data to support methodology
available
Methodology data input/output
accuracy at least equivalent
to present conceptual design
cost projections
Capability to provide reasonable
automation conceptual design
configurations/cost estimates
Ability to identify and charac-
terize key design attributes
Ability to discretely quantify
all design attributes
Hierarchical prioritization of
man-machine alternatives and
technology options
Practical incorporation of exis-
ting research data from ather
related spacecraft automation
and costing studies (e.g.,
ARAMIS, THURIS, PRC cost model)a
X
X
	
X
Input
	
Output
X
X
X
Demonstration of methodology on	 X	 X
actual space station subsystems
	
Limited demon-	 Other
stration on	 subsystems
storage battery
example
aA]FAM1S, Automation, Robotics and Machine Intelligence Systems (MIT);
THURIS, The Human Role in Space (Marshall Space Flight Center); and PRC,
Pl,nn ag "^.,aearch Corporation.
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SECTION II
SPACE STATION AUTONOMY/AUTOMATION STUDY DEFINITION
A. OVERVIEW
Section I briefly describes the task background as related to the
original Autonomous Spacecraft System Technology program. This discussion
also notes that recent developments associated with the JSC Space Station
requirements definition were incorporated in the study to keep the thrust of
the man-machine trade-off task also in line with the manned spacecraft
program. This section (Section II) describes how elements of both programs
were combined to define the conceptual foundation for the methodology.
Additionally, a brief summary of other associated automation research
activities is provided with an explanation of how those activities relate to
this study.
B. AUTONOMOUS SPACECRAFT SYSTEM TECHNOLOGY
It is important to understand some of the products of the ASST program
(defined in Section I-B) and how they relate to this study.
Early unmanned spacecraft were designed as semi-automated systems.
Hardwired sequencers controlled payload functions on the basis of a timer
initiated in the launch phase of the mission. Trajectory correction maneuvers
that maintained the nominal timeline of the sequencers were ground-initiated
and automatically executed by on-board, hardwired controls. Increasing
mission complexity with attendant payload and spacecra=t control requirements
led to the provision of in-flight, programmable sequencing and control that
was eventually supplied by on-board digital computers. Additional mission
complexity results in increased risk of failure, which may be countered by
dedication of some portion of the on-board control resource to fault-
protection. The existence of a programmable control resource with access to
the engineering data of the spacecraft allows closed-loop control for both
fault protection/redundancy management and maintenance of the operating
condition of subsystem components.
The preceding description is an example of an automated system evolving
into ar, autonomous system. That is, an automat:ed system functions within a
limited and Pre-defined scope of circumstances. The addition of
fault-tolerance and the ability to adapt control behavior to changing externel
and internal conditions leads to an autonomous system. This definition allows
the "'man-in-the-loop" to act as an addit^ onal source of information for the
control structure. It is exactly this kind of experience that has allowed a
better understanding of how to design autonomous systems. The ASST studies
have pooled this experience and provided some rules of thumb for designing
autonomous and automated systems (Reference 2-1). Basically, autonomy
requires a three-step control structure. Those processes that require
closed-loop control may cycle from step (3) back to step (1) in the following
listing (Reference 2-2):
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(1) Sense and analyze the state of internal or external quantities
that are inputs to the control process.
(2) Derive and command a response by the system that meets an
appropriate objective.
(3) Act to implement the response.
The control process is implemented through control resources that
connect command resources with data-management resources. Sensory data
required by the command resource may be collected and communicated by
data-management resources in a manner typically used for engineering
telemetry. As system complexity increases, distribution of separate control
resources to the subsystem level and below offers the advantages of (1)
reducing the pressure of multiple demands upon a central data-management
resource, (2) reducing the interdependence of subsystems, and (3) supporting
the flexibility of the system to meet new requirements without major
reconfiguration. This type of control structure with the above inherent
advantages implies that utilizing a hierarchical functional architecture is an
efficient and flexible first step for incorporating automation for system
autonomy. The decoupling of functions, where feasible, also simplifies
integration testing of the system and evolutionary addition of new capability.
Figure 2-1 demonstrates an example functional control hierarchy for
spacecraft core functions (see Reference 2-1). The levels of the hierarchy
are numbered, beginning with level 0, representing the executive control
functions required for system control and crew/ground interface functions.
Traditional functional subsystems have executive control functions at level 1
that allow for direct external control and that interface with the level 0
station executive functions. Level 2 represents the control and execution of
internal applications performed b y the subsystems. Lower levels are typically
provided for control sensors and "smart" sensors, and actuators that implement
the functions of the subsystems. A similar hierarchical structure is employed
in the methodology. In the case of the functional network analysis the
functions and crew tasks are first generically identified (at the system
level) and then allocated to modules and subsystems. This was done primarily
to simplify automation concept development and eventual programming of the
trade-off model. The concept development and costing steps are also
hierarchical in nature and, where automated functions are integrated across
subsystems, allow economies of scale to surface. The optimization routine at
the end of the methodology is essentially a linear programming problem that
was able to be easily structured as a result of the hierarchical approach
taken in designing the methodology.
C.	 NASA MANNED SPACE STATION PROJECT
The aims of tl,e NASA Space Station Piogram are:
(1) To develop a permanently manned Space Station within a decade.
(2) To invite other countries to participate.
(3) To promote private-sector investment in space.
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In support of these aims, the following long-term Space Station program
j	 objectives have been established by NASA (Reference 2-3):
(1) Establish the means for permanent presence of people in space.
(2) Initially enable routine, continuous utilization of space for
science applications, technology development, and commercial
exploitation.
(3) Develop and exploit the synergism of the man-machine combination
in space.
(4) Provide essential system elements and operational practices for an
integrated national space capability.
(5) Reduce the cost and complexity of working and living in space
while also assuring a high level of safety and reliability.
The engineering guidelines for Space Station include provisions for contim ous
habitation; Shuttle usage for initial launch, resupply, and crew rotation;
cost reduction by maximizing commonality; evolutionary growth through
maintainable and restorable systems; manned and unmanned elements; and
autonomous operation with the ability to upgrade systems as new technologies
become available. The entire system is planned to be customer-oriented for
flexibility and simplicity of customer interfaces.
The NASA U SC) system requirements effort, which resulted in the
detailed engineering guidelines, provided key information for constructing the
methodology framework. First, the requirements provided some reference
	 if
configurations that assisted in understanding the overall modular design and
in determining where major subsystems might be located in relation to
pressurized versus unpressurized volumes. The reference configuration
selected as the most preferable, based on cost and design flexibility, is the
strawman example employed in this study. Second, the requirements effort
provided operational information essential to developing the functional task	 !
networks (specifically related to crew task descriptions, rendezvous and	 ,.
docking activities, and payloads). Finally, the requirements activity
provided some useful component failure data which, again, was essential to
understanding crew interactions with system failures as part of the
functional-task networks.
D.	 SUMMARY OF OTHER RELATED AUTONOMY/AUTOMATION STUDIES
1.	 THURIS
The most encompassing man-machine automation assessment presently
being conducted is The Human Role In Space (THURIS) effort sponsored by the
Marshall Space Flight Center. The THURIS study is a 1-year effort designed to
(1) investigate the role and the required degree of direct involvement of
humans in future space missions, (2) establish criteria for the allocation of
functional activities between humans and machines, and (3) provide insight
into technology requirements, economics, and benefits of the human presence in
space (Reference 2-4). Although the THURIS effort primarily addresses tasks
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as independent, unrelated elements, the overall effort has provided an
excellent bank of information consisting of activity definitions, component
costs, cost versus activity -level plots, and technology projections. All of
the THURIS results are extremely useful data inputs to the network portion of
the methodology developed in this study.
2. ARAMIS
One vital precursor Co the THURIS program has been the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Automation, Robotics, and Machine
Intelligence Systems (ARAMIS) study (Reference 2-5). The study first
identifies tasks that may potentially be required by future space programs,
based on projects such as Geostationary Platform (GSP) and the Teleoperator
Maneuvering System (TMS), and defines ARAMIS possibilities that represent
candidates for the generic tasks. The study then subjectively evaluates the
relative merits of the possibilities. Finally, the study identifies promising
applications of ARAMIS and recommends specific areas for further research.
Again, the foundation for the functional network analysis developed in this
study draws largely on the ARAMIS space activities study as well as historical
task data from Skylab and Space Shuttle.
3. Other Space Station Automation Studies
A brief mention is made here of some private-sector studies which,
although not as broad as THURIS or ARAMIS, provided useful conceptual design,
task, and ergonomics data for the extra vehicular activity (EVA) activity
(e.g., on-orbit EVA assembly, maintenance, and remote manipulator activities).
The MATRA study, prepared for the European Space Agency, assesses the
role of humans in space in a similar fashion as THURIS (Reference 2-6). A
qualitative review of major functions in space, which can be automated or
performed by humans, is made with emphasis on assemuly and servicing or
repair. In an effort to demonstrate the practical nature of potential man and
machine roles, twu mission scenarios (assembly and servicing) are used to
demonstrate possible man-machine combinations. The Essex Corporation study
(Reference 2-7) provides an excellent bank of information on a whole series of
EVA tasks. The study progresses from manual (with tool assist), through
remote, to fully automated operations. Additionally, useful cost information
is provided for the various kinds of augmenting or totally automated
equipment. Last, the Loughead, Pruett study, also of ESSEX origin, provides
an in-depth study of the EVA function as related to manipulation and assembly
of large space structure columns (Reference 2-8). The major thrust of this
study is to examine assembly procedures, tools, and hardware configurations
for the prediction of assembly times of large, complex structures in space.
4. Foundation for Man-Machine Trade-off Structure
Having summarized other contributing literature, it is appropriate
to recap briefly the one study that provided the framework for the man-machine
trade-off methodology presented in this report. The U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and Bureau of Mines have long been concerned about the extremely high
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fatality and disabling injury rates in underground coal mining. Consequently,
DOE funded JPL to develop a design plan for automating underground mining
machinery (Reference 2-9). This plan had to be sensitive to industry's needs,
as well as to cost and the worker.
Several steps were required to identify potential areas for automation,
establish the appropriate sensor, guidance, and control technology, and
determine productivity impacts and cont benefits. The first step was the
identification Of automation opportunities. The assessment consisted of
developing functional descriptions for each major component in the mining
system, followed by conducting an industry survey of equipment manufacturers
and designers, mine managers, and miners. The functional description provided
information on mining operations, the present degree of system mechanization,
and operations potentially amenable to automation. The survey confirmed the
system operational and functional descriptions and provided valuable
information on problem areas for which automation could enhance productivity
or improve miner health and safety. These findings largely formed the basis
for determining the automation opportunities.
The second step was to assemble the functional descriptions into a
network. A detailed underground mining operational network was assembled,
based on the functional descriptions, industry inputs, and additional
industrial engineering data obtained from mining studies. The industrial
engineering data were crucial to understanding system delays that detracted
from production time but had potential to be streamlined with automation.
Once the automation opportunities (developed from the considerations
summarized above) were reflected in the form of appropriate dela ys in the
network, an estimate of potential increase in productivity was obtained.
The third step was to perform an automation technology assessment. The
technologies required to implement each automation opportunity were
ide._ified. This effort included an investigation of appropriate sensor
technology, development of mathematical models for each affected system
component to establish the location and data feedback for each sensor, and
conceptual design of guidance and control systems. The technology assessment
included preliminary cost estimates and schedules for developing the various
automation candidates. Mitigation of potential health and safety hazards was'
also part of the technology assessment.	 1
The last step was a comparison of costs and benefits, whicn were
established for each automation opportunity by comparing the projected
productivity improvements against capital and operating costs. Other
variables derived from health and safety impacts, market-potential, and market-
penetration rates were also factored into the final cost-benefit calculation.
The automation opportunities were then prioritized to allow formulation of a
development plan. Overall, when reviewed by the mining industry, the final
results were considered to be reasonably correct, based on independent
private-sector research in automation. Additionally, one of the larger mining
companies ultimately adopted the proposed automation development plan.
Although similar to the mining problem, the methodology developed for
assess ; rg Space Station man-machine trade-offs had to be tailored to consider
the different working environment, a much larger array of worker activit
and man-machine combinations, consideration of a greater number of
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cost-benefit attributes, and a such broader advanced technology scope. In
comparison to the THURIS and ARAMIS studies, this methodology provides more
depth in the conceptual design and costing areas, a more comprehensive
approach to identifying and linking crew tasks with Space Station
functions/modules, and a complete structure for melding together a large
amount of data from different studies into a comprehensive man-machine design
t7ade-off tool. Additionally, a man-machine and technology optimization
approach is provided that considers the system as a whole. Overall, this
study serves to enhance and increase the scope of the THURIS and ARAMIS
efforts. The revised methodology framework is presented in Section III of
this report.
1
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SECTION III
GENERAL METHODOLOGY FRAMEWORK
A.	 OVERVIEW
Section Ii indicates that the methodology presented in this report
represents another building block to the THURIS and ARAMIS research. The
basic frmwwork for the man-machine trade-off technique is summarized in
Section 1 and is discussed in greater depth in this section. Specifically,
areas are highlighted in which distinct differences occur between this
methodology and THURIS or ARAMIS.
As stated earlier, the methodology is divided into four major elements:
(1) Network Analysis.
(2) Conceptual Design and Costing.
(3) Attribute Measures.
(4) Cost-Benefit Analysis.
Each element is made up of specific analytical procedures that act as building
blocks and that provide data inputs for the next step. The major elements and
some key prot-adures are displayed in Figure 1-1. Each element and analytical
procedure is discussed in the following paragraphs.
B.	 NETWORK ANALYSIS
Crew productivity is one of the high design priorities. Figure 3-1
demonstrates the importance of the crew's available productive time for both
initial operational capability (IOC) and out-year growth configurations. The
curves shown in Figure 3-1 qualitatively represent the variables shown on the
y axes. For example, the level of assembly activity is expected to be very
high ariund IOC and then taper off in out-years. Similarly, the system
failure curve is the standard "bathtub" function in which there is an early
"shake-out" period, followed by a period of stabilization, and last b y aging
accompanied by failure creep. Finally, the Space Station will be expected to
handle an increasing number of experiments and ether payloads (such as
manufacturing processes, etc.) with time. Two important potential time
drivers early in the station's life are clearly the assembly and shake-out
activities. These activities will probably consume a large portion of both
the on-orbit and ground crews' time, regardless of the amount of automation
incorporated. Around the middle and later portions of the station's life the
experiments, payloads, and failure-creep time drivers comprise the bulk of
demand on crew time. Of specific concern will be the following variables:
(1) There may be a large number of non-routine tasks associated with
tending experiments or manufacturing processes.
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Figure 3-1. Major Factors Affecting the Demand for Crew Productive Time
During Initial Operational Capability and Out-Year Operation
(2) Station /payload interface problems may occur with having to monitor,
collect (or segregate), and compare vast arrays of different
experimental control parameters.
(3) There may be a constantly changing variety of experiments that may
require a large number of non-routine handling procedures.
The major thrust of these considerations is that both the Space Station
and ground crews must be free to perform those tasks that (1) allow the
station to be assembled and operating as soon as possible and (2) maximize the
utilization of the station. To these ends, the first facet of the cost-benefit
framework, the nct or'k analyaia,
	 those tasks that are prime candi-
dates for automation. Network analysis provides an operational map of equip-
ment functions and crew tasks that must be performed both in parallel and
series. Specific attention is paid to the crew tasks because it is here that
benefits of automation are fully realized. The Space Station network analysis
recently completed drew upon results of ARAMIS, THURIS, and operational
experience from Skylab and Shuttle to develop a baseline network. Once the
networks were assembled, they were reviewed by the Shuttle Operations Support
Group ( JSC) to ensure that the various functions or tasks, although
extrapolated to fit the Space Station concept, were reasonably representative
of actual on-orbit operations. Besides providing insight into potential time
and operational savings, the network analysis (in addition to the previous
Skylab and Shuttle experience) provided an understanding of task areas where
the crew could be exposed to major hazards. Table 3-1 summarizes those
top-level functions or tasks which, if automated, would have major impacts for
W^ QW
Table 3-1. Key Automation Candidates Impacting
Crew Productivity and/or Safety
Area Most Affected by Automation
Space Station Crew	 Ground Crew
Key
Automation
Candidates	 IOCa	 Growth	 IOCa	 Growth
System/subsystem state 	 X	 X	 X
changeb
System assembly/on-orbit
structural manufacturing	 X	 X
Monitoring
	
X	 X	 X	 X
Verification/calibration	 X	 X	 X	 X
Fault isolation/management	 X	 X	 X	 X
Extra vehicular activity	 X	 X
Mission planning	 X	 X	 X
Rendezvous/docking	 X	 X	 X
a lnitial Operational Capability.
bRefers to initiation of control functions as a planned activity.
enhancing crew productivity and/or safety. For example, automation of
structural manufacturing processes (such as truss structures) and system
assembly will probably have the greatest impact on station-crew productivity
and safety during the period when assembly activity is the highest, which is
around IOC. During this same period, automation of these activities will also
greatly enhance supervision and control by the ground crew. Similarly,
because ground crew involvement will be the major source of mission planning
and docking control around IOC, Table 3-1 shows the greatest impact of
automation occurring with the ground crew, followed by a shift to the station
crew in the out-year growth. Of course, automation of EVA activities will
greatly enhance the station crew's available payload tending time and safety
during both IOC and growth. For purposes of this initial research activity,
only on-orbit, steady-state crew functions were examined.
Ia summary, with the exception of system assembly and EVA, the remaining
car_didates in Table 3-1 historically have consumed in excess of 40% of a
mission day. For example, on-orbit monitoring, verification/calibration, and
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planning have consumed slightly more than 40% of a 9- to 10-h work period.
Fault isolation and repair have consumed anywhere from 5 min to several hours
per day. Rendezvous and docking maneuvers, although only requiring active
crew involvement for the last half hour before docking, have required fairly
constant monitoring for 4 to 6 hours before the actual dock. Finally, EVA,
although an important asset, has required 3 to 4 hours of preparation and
de-preparation time, usually involving two to three people. Both EVA and
docking are important network variables because of the potential high
frequencies cf activity reflected in present station operating plans.
Although actual on-orbit task experience is discussed in much greater
depth in Section IV, the preceding discussion serves to illustrate the
importance of network analysis in identifying potential areas for automation
based primarily on how redundant, time-consuming, or safety-endangering the
crew tasks are. Other automation selection criteria are discussed in
Section IV. The major difference between the approach used in this
methodology and ARAMIS/THURIS is that generic tasks are linked together into
an operational network for each Space Station module, as opposed to merely
identifying tasks as independent functions.
C.	 CONCEPTUAL DESIGN AND COSTING
Having identified the prime automation candidates as a first step, the
next step in the cost-benefit framework is to develop a conceptual design for
each candidate automated function. Ultimately, each conceptual aesign is
life-cycle cost.ed tc establish the cost side of the cost-benefit algorithm.
The conceptual design approach is hierarchical in nature; that is, not only
must a function be managed at the subsystem level but also at the system
level, specifically because many subsystem control variables, being integrated
with other subsystems, have system-level control impacts (see Reference 2-1).
The following estimates are extracted from the conceptual designs and provide
the basis for the costing effort:
(1) The number of dedicated microprocessors and integrating networks.
(2) Number of both dedicated communication links and integrating
	
s	 .
communication links.
(3) Software requirements.
(4) Software complexity.
(5) Number of additional sensors and suggested number of backup
microprocessors and other necessary components for fault
management.
Figure 3-2 isolates the generic automation elements of any
function/subsystem. An interesting aspect of this figure is that, whether a
function is automated or not, existing manned spacecraft design usually
dictates that the sensors, comparators; serve s / a ctuators, data management, and
communication components already be in place to enable crew control.
Therefore, the only additional components are generally those shown in the
inside box.
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Figure 3-2. Major Components of a Generic Automated Subsystem
The conceptual design and costing step is explored in greater depth in
Section V, along with a supporting example. It is important to state here
that the basic difference between the THURIS effort and this study is that the
conceptual designs for automation are carried to a greater level of detail.
Additionally, as the automation concepts are developed, this level of detail
allows a clearer understanding of areas in which subsystems can share common
processors and thus contribute to economies of scale.
The last analytical procedure associated with the conceptual -design step
is a determination of an "efficient" subscc of man-machine mixes. For
example, Table 3-1 shows that the crew can be involved in monitoring,
verification or calibration, anomaly troubleshooting, and repair. One
possible alternative is to allow the system to operate without any additional
automation. This would mean that the on-orbit and ground crews would
basically perform all three of these tasks as presently performed on Shuttle.
Another alternative might be to let the crews do the monitoring and
verification tasks but allow switch -over to automated fault management when an
anomaly or failure is detected. As yet another alternative, all three tasks
could be automated. Indeed, not all alternatives offer the same payoff on
crew productivity time. Furthermore, because cost and productivity time are
major design drivers, it is essential to select alternatives that predict the
best productivity results for a given cost. This initial sorting process is
important because control of a specific subsystem within a module might
involve a rather large array of man-machine alternatives. The sorting routine
merely selects those mixes that `.ave Lhe best increase in productivity for a
a;^an ^ ^ q t. Other alternatives that offer lower returns for the same, oz
cost fall into a sub-optimal cost productivity region and are
3-S
discarded. The net result is an efficient subset of man-machine alternatives.
In addition to trimming the size of the alternative array, this step also
makes t ►ie data-gathering process less unwieldy when considering the other
cost-benefit attributes and station modules.
D.	 AUTOMATION ATTRIBUTE MEASURES
The third facet of the cost-benefit framework involves the determination
of measures for the attributes of automation. The total list of the
attributes (not prioritized) includes the following:
(1) Crew safety (hazard exposure in h/mission day).
(2) Crew/ground operational efficiency (workhours/mission day).
(3) IOC automation hardware/software costs (19840.
(4) Life-cycle automation hardware/software costs (1984$).
(5) Weight limitations (launch cost, 1984$).
(6) Power consumption (additional power hardware, 1984$).
(7) System/subsystem reliability (maintenance and spares costs, 1984$).
(8) Research and development risk (dollars required to make technology
available by IOC, 1984$).
(9) Importance to future missions (subjective value).
(10) Amenability to retrofit (subjective value).
It should be noted that, although the preceding variables are termed
"attributes," the model is being designed so that each of these variables can
be reflected as either a cost "saver" or a cost "driver."
The first item listed (safety) is a difficult attribute to quantify,
especially because there is very little accident/injury history to which some
type of 'value-of-life" costing technique can be applied. However, the
network analysis can identify functions that have crew safety impacts.
Therefore, a qualitative weight can be assigned to the final cost-benefit
calculation on those functions that jointly reduce exposure to hazards.
Crew and ground operational efficiency (or productivity) improvement due
to automation may be approximated by a corresponding reduction in labor costs
if such reduction takes place. However, if, for example, on-orbit crew time
is saved due to automation, the value of such savings would be more properly
measured in terms of the present values of additional future experiments in
which crew members can engage. Such values may be estimated by the
attractiveness of increased experimentation or on-orbit manufacturing capacity
per rission (in terms of profit per additional mission day).
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Because the cost of automation is covered in the preceding subsection,
it will not be discussed here.
The value of weight reduction due to automation depends crucially upon
r
	
	
whether or not the weight is a limiting constraint. For example, if the
weight reduction is not accompanied with any changes in configuration of other
payloads, lower frequency of launches, reduced size of launch vehicle, or any
other factors, then the value of such weight reduction is zero. However, if
I
	
	
the weight reduction enables additional payloads to be carried or increases
the weight allocated to other payloads or subsystems (such as substitution of
heavier but less costly materials), then the value of the weight reduction
would be measured by the value of these modifications.
The power attribute can be quantified in terms of the net power savings
or increase caused by automating subsystem functions. The value placed on
power usage is measured in terms of either the cost of generating additional
power or the cost of reducing the power requirements in other ways. On the
other hand, the dollar value of power savings is measured in terms of either
the cost savings of not generating additional power, or the value of
additional experiments that are made feasible due to the power addition.
The reliability attribute has several cost aspects. The first aspect is
the early consideration of component/subsystem functional self-test for test
and verification both before Design, Development, Test, and Evaluation (DDT&E)
and during IOC. The dollar value placed on this reliability aspect is
measured primarily through the net dollars saved by using the same DDT&E
test/verification hardware and software in the actual IOC station. This
includes using a common communication and control language across all
subsystems that facilitates the operator-system interface.
The other aspects of reliability have to do with measuring the benefits
of using fault isolation and fault management. The benefits are measurable
primarily through the previously stated productivity and safety attributes, as
well as hardware and software component reductions due to commonality across
subsystems. For example, fault isolation is a critical network function
because it often takes considerable crew time to track down an anomaly or
component failure. Historical failure data from Skylab and Shuttle indicate
that the fault-isolation function occurs on a daily basis. Therefore, the
on-orbit and ground-crew time savings are potentially significant. Similarly,
resolving anomalies or failures can also be extremely time-consuming. Again,
crew productivity and segregation from safety-endangering tasks such as EVA
and maintenance (e.g., electrical troubleshooting, handling components) are
priorities. Another measurable benefit comes from the different ways
automation can handle component failures (see Reference 2-1):
(1) The design can incorporate automated component redundancy and
switching.
(2) The design can incorporate a means of automatically managing the
key variables controlled by the component (e.g., reduce rev/min or
power input), prioritize activity demands, and shed low-priority
demands.
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(3) As a subset of (2) above, the design may automatically indicate
that no component change or fault-management decision is necessary
(e.g., knowing that only a malfunction indicator light has failed).
(4) The design can incorporate a means of automatically locating and
switching to another component/software routine in an integrated
subsystem that can assume the same controlling function (i.e.,
functional redundancy).
The net dollar benefit is measured in the value of the components saved by not
requiring complete redundancy in all subsystems. Secondary cost-benefits are
measurable through the dollars saved by being able to schedule maintenance and
establish subsequent spare component procurement/stock levels more efficiently
(i.e., ordering long-lead-time items in advance reduces the problem of paying
a premium price for crisis production).
The last attribute, R&D risk, is an important cost-benefit consideration
because it provides a measure of the costs associated with (1) spending more
money for in-place spares to make up for reduced reliability in newer
technologies and (2) spending more money to make newer technologies available
sooner.
E.	 COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
The last facet of the cost-benefit framework is the actual cost-benefit
calculation itself. The basic approach is to convert all costs and cost
savings to present values and calculate the IOC and net cost-benefits over the
station life cycle (20 years). This approach is necessary because some
benefits are not evident until several years after IOC (e.g., on-orbit crew
productivity savings or industry profits). This overall cost-benefit modeling
approach is unique because it provides a means of considering trade-offs
between varying degrees of automation/autonomy (as related primarily to
greater or lesser crew involvement) and/or different technologies. The
varying degrees of automation are considered primarily through changes in the
operations efficiency, cost savings, and safety attributes. The selection of
different technologies is considered by examining the preceding three
attributes plus PAD time, safety, reliability, weight and power savings,
technology importance relative to mission, and amenability to retrofit. Each
man-machine alternative within the efficient subset is ultimately ranked,
based on multi-attribute decision analysis. The multi-attribute technique is
used when the outcome of a decision involving a complex system (such as
selecting an ideal man-machine mix for Space Station) involves several
criteria. Decision makers (experts in the given system arena) are asked to
place values on the various criteria, or attributes. Based on the relative
values obtained from the decision makers, weights are placed on each attribute
so the trade-offs between the various outcomes can be made and the outcomes
ranked to express the preferences of the decision makers. In this same manner
a small, attractive set of man-machine alternatives (outcomes) it. selected for
each subsystem and module in the Space Station system. As a simple subjective
demonstration, consider the example in which the experts are asked to estimate
the relative utility of the net benefits, crew productivity, and safety as
related to automating a specific function on Space Station. The experts might
report the following:
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(1) An improvement in safety is preferred, but conformance with
existing levels of safety is acceptable; degradation in safety is
absolutely unacceptable.
(2) A specific man-machine alternative must demonstrate a positive net
cost-benefit to prevent the R&D program for the associated
subsystem exceeding a hard-cost ceiling. Therefore, the net cost-
benefit attribute is weighted heavily.
(3) A large productivity improvement is preferred. However, a small-
to-medium improvement in productivity is acceptable as long as it
is accompanied by a positive cost-benefit. No improvement in crew
productivity is counter-productive to future programmatic demands
and is, therefore, unacceptable.
The final optimal subgroup of alternatives would be those man-machine mixes
that jointly exhibit a positive net cost savings, demonstrate a productivity
improvement, and maintain safety at present levels. An example "preferred"
alternative might be one in which all subsystem monitoring is done by the crew
until an anomaly surfaces, at which time the crew allows the subsystem to
verify itself and proceeds to fault isolate and manage the anomaly or failure,
followed by some type of status-report feedback. A more concrete example is
provided later in Section VII.
At the completion of the subsystem cost-benefit assessment and selectio,,
of optimal man-machine mix, the problem is still only half-solved. The best
combination(s) of man-machine alternatives must be chosen across all
subsystems and modules. To do this analytical procedure, a standard
life-cycle cost algorithm is used along with a cost target. The calculation
basically determines which set of man-machine mixes reduces the total system
cost the most, thereby either meeting or bettering the cost target, or
minimizing the difference between the actual and target costs. In comparison
with the THURIS effort, this approach provides a more comprehensive o ►eaas of
optimizing the man-machine mix for the complete system.
The last step in the trade-off analysis considers the incorporation of
future technologies that may not be available or mature by the intended 1992
initial operational capability. In this last analytical procedure various
technologies applicable to each automation function are assigned respective
quantitative and subjective values for each of the cen attributes. Sever of
the attributes (IOC and life-cycle costs, safety, reliability, productivity
time, weight, and power) are the same as used earlier for the man-sachine mix
optimization. Three other attributes, RED time (as related to the investment
necessary to make technology available), technology importance (as related to
meeting potential evolutionary mission requirements), and retrofit amenability
were added to describe the Program Manager's decision environment more fully.
Again, using multi-attribute decision theory in a manner similar to the above
example, the various technology options are ranked, based on how well each
option ultimately compares with others relative to the attribute measures. In
this manner a future retrofit program can be developed. Although somewhat
similar to THURIS, this approach provides a more quantitative means of
weighing advanced technologies.
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SECTION IV
NETWORK ANALYSIS
A. OVERVIEW
Enhancement of crew productive time is an important Space Station design
attribute. It is anticipated that automation of various functions will
streamline station operations to allow the station crew more on-orbit time for
payloads while at the same time reducing ground-crew involvement. The tool
'
	
	
used to measure productivity impacts is a network that describes each functioni
and activity in the system by increments of time elements. Time savings
through automation are then identified to identify the potential productivity
impacts. Consideration is given to crew preferences on various man-machine
mixes. The following sections of the report provide the early results of the
network analysis using ARAMIS, THURIS, Skylab, and Shuttle operational
experience superimposed on one of the Space Station reference configurations
developed during the recent JSC design requirements activity.
B. STRAWMAN CONCEPTUAL SPACE STATION DESIGN
The ARAMIS and THURIS studies identified generic spacecraft functions
and crew activities. It is important to recognize that, whenever concepts are
developed that either extend or require new technology, there is usually not a
one-to-one correspondence between the old and new functional modes of
operation. Therefore, extremely useful preparatory steps to the functional
_
	
	 network analysis are (1) to establish a strawman conceptual design and (2) to
superimpose the known activities onto the design as a baseline functional, or
operational, description. By using this approach, generic functions in the
new system can be identified and located (e.g., functions delineated by
unpressurized or pressurized areas). There are also more payloads on the
Space Station located in unpressurized areas than on Skylab or Shuttle. This
r
	
	
reconfiguration could, therefore, require greater extra vehicular activity
(EVA) if present methods are used for maintenance. The strawman design used
for this study is shown in Figure 4-1 (Reference 4-1), which highlights the
four basic modules:
(1) Resource, or Power.
(2) Laboratory.
(3) Command/Control and Habitat.
(4) Logistics.
The resource module primarily contains the solar arrays, radiators,
,storage batteries, fuel cells, and supporting structures (which includes
mechanisms such as motors, gimbals, etc.). The command/control and habitat
modules are basically the centers where the guidance, navigation,
station-control, data-management, and communication functions take place.
These modules are also where the crew sleeping quarters, galley, and support
systems are located. the support systems include components such as medical
4-1
r,
7F POOR	 LITY
r ..w	 ,•A^ ;ee
,. 
• A; ! ;may 
3^  
3, 	 Y
r f I
v
^ t y^• r 	/
POWER MODULE
r'.
LOGISTICS MODULE
,.	 r
v'
I
LASORATOPV MODULES
r^
HA3ITAT AND
COMMAND/CONTkOL
MODULES
Figure 4-1. Strawman Space Station Design
^T
4-2
.	 I
1
facilities, EVA equipment or manned maneuvering units (MMUs). The laboratory
module is where the internal paylc,sds (or experiments) are controlled. Last,
the logistics module contains spare supplies and might act as a workplace for
component repairs. Figure 4-2 displays the corresponding Space Station system
hierarchy used in this methodology for modeling the crew functions and
inter&-ti.ons with each subsystem and module.
Each module contains many subsystems, which in turn have several crew
any!/or machine activities associated with the control of the subsystems,
modules, and system as a whole. Some modules share many of the subsystems
(e.g., data management). The Figure 4-2 system hierarchy serves three
importsuz functions in the methodology:
Figure 4-2. Space Station System Modeling Hierarchy
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(1) It provides a basis for identifying extrapolated crew functions
with the appropriate subsystem, module, and system operations.
which in turn provides a conceptual basis for applying automation
technology.
(2) Once automation technology is applied to various crew functions,
it provides a theoretical structure for assessing automation costs
and savings (discussed in greater detail in Section VII).
(3) It provides a simple means of examining abbreviated forms of the
Space Station design if funding is not available for the complete
configuration shown in Figure 4-1.
It should be noted that there is another hierarchical level below the
"man-machine functional" level shown in Figure 4-2. For example, the
fault-management function and its associated task time might vary from a
simple switching procedure to an actual troubleshooting and repair procedure,
depending on the component and nature of the failure. The ability to
differentiate between these task* is directly related to the granularity of
the historical tack-time data. Although outside the scope of this study, it
is expected that a better determination of the actual granularity of task-time
experience will be established in follow-on research phases. An approach to
obtain the varying task times for fault management is provided later in this
section.
Once a strawman conceptual design and associated system hierarchy is
developed, the next step is to develop the functional task network for the
station and ground crews and to identify the automation candidates.
C.	 FUNCTIONAL,-TASK NETWORK DEVELOPMENT
The scope of this study prevented the complete chain of Space Station
functional-task networks from being developed. Therefore, to demonstrate the
network process it was decided to concentrate on two modules that posed key
man-machine interface issues. To select the appropriate modules, key
individuals at each NASA center who were members of the original station
conceptual design group (CDG) were contacted (Reference 4-2). The results of
the interviews suggested that the resource (power) and command/control modules
were two "high" human interface areas. The power module was considered
important because, unlike Shuttle, the Space Station power subsystems could be
largely exterior to the pressurized modules (see Figure 4-1). Therefore,
major man-machine trade-off issues arose concerning (1) suLc;stems that should
be brought inside pressurized areas for operation and control purposes and
(2) potential EVA maintainance activities. The command/control module is
important because it represents the hub of command and controi activities,
especially guidance, navigation, reboost, and docking. This selection of
modules was especially advantageous because it provided two extreme cases:
(1) examination of a fairly straightforward power subsystem within the
resource module (the storage batteries) and (2) examination of a much more
complicated subsystem within the command/control module (navigation, guidance,
and control for rendezvous and docking). High-level networks were developed
for all the functions in the power and command/control modules so that the
1
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example cases could be isolated while clearly showing the connection with the
other subsystems and system as a whole.
1.	 Network Foundation
The classical tool used in developing functional -tank networks is
the PERT diagram ( References 4-3 and 4-4). PERT diagrams are useful for
separating a large, complicated process into activities and delays to identify
the major variables necessary to complete a project or process. Activities
and delays (called events) are networked as shown in Figure 4-3. Events that
occur in a straight line ( Events 1 and 2 above) are in series because Event 1
must occur before Event 2. Event 3 is in parallel with Events 1 and 2 because
it can occur while these two events are happening. In a simila r
 manner, the
complete process is diagrammed from beginning to end.
The complete application of the PERT approach usually requires that
best, worst, and denired event completion times be used. Multiplying the
probability of an event being completed ( based on historical experience) by
the three completion -time estimates results in the expected value for
finishing a specific task. When all the beat estimates of task completion
have been placed in the network, the minimum time to complete the whole
process can be determined. This is called the critical path and is an
important baseline to establish ways of streamlining the process.
The use of the network approach implies that a series of events has a
beginning and an end, or some definable cycle. In the case of Space Station,
a reasonable cycle seems to be the period between Space Shuttle resupply and
crew changes (i.e., approximately every three to six months). For this
initidi feasibility study a more deterministic approach was taken by using
trear-. touk times for major crew activities. Task areas requiring more
definit::on are displayed as ranges (e.g., fault management). It is
anticipated that more detailed task definitions and time ranges can be
obtained eventually through examination of the THURIS task time-line data and
START
EVENT
3
TIME TO COMPLETE EVENT 3 _ ( ENDEVENT
^3
TIME TO
COMPLETE
END	 START	 EVENT 2	 END
EVENT	 EVENT	 EVE NT
1	 2	 2
Figure 4-3. Example Network
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closer scrutiny of Shuttle operational legs. The emphasis placed on this
initial network study waa fourfold:
(1) Identify major activities and activity sequences.
(2) Establish network structures that eventual?y can be programmed for
critical-path analysis.
(3) Identify major man-machine Lasko that represent reasonable initial
candidates for automation.
	
y °	 (4) Uae the network framework and initial candidates to help structure
the rest of the man-machine trade-off model.
2.	 Network Analysis
Based on Skylab and Shuttle (References 4-5 and 4-6) experience,
	
_	 the top-level primary Space StP.tion functions are as follows (not necessarily
in order of priority):
(1)	 Housekeeping.
(2)	 Command/control.
(a) Change in station state as part of a planned mission
scenario.
(b) Monitoring.
(c) Verifying/calibrating control variables.
(d) Fault investigating, adjusting, or repairing.
(3)
	
Mission planning.
(4)
	
Extra vehicular activity.
(5)	 Experimenting.
(6)	 Rendezvous and docking.
For purposes of this study only Functions (2) through (6) are directly
associated with the power and command/control modules. Because housekeeping
is basically an overhead function, it was decided to remove housekeeping from
the list of functions and to establish. a "mission essential" timeline in which
to examine operational impacta .f automation. Table 4-1 displays the
approximate amount of time required for housekeeping functions, as well as the
time remaining for other mission-essential functions.
Table 4-1 shows that the individual productive time available is about
10 h per mission day. Once the mission overhead was rer.oved, the next step
was to establish the in-flige,,., schedule-loading characteristics of the
various resource and command/control man-machine functions. The resource
L	 4-6
Table 4-1. Approximate On-Orbit Time Available for Command/Control Types
of Functions ( Hours / Person/Day)
Housekeeping Functions	 Hours/Person/Day
Pre-sleep activities 0.7
Sleep 6 to 8
Post-sleep activities 0.7
Meal preparation 0.3
Meal 1.0 0 meals/day)
Post-meal clean-up/biocide application 0.3
Waste-water dump 0.3
Supply-water dump 0.3
CO2 absorber replacement 0.1 (about 3/day)
Fuel-cell purge 0.1 (about 2/day)
Check safety devices 0.3 (about 2/day)
Crew free time 1.0
Subtotal	 13.7
Productive Time Available
	 24 - 13.7 = 10.3
module, which was the easiest, was investigated first. Figure 4-1 illustrates
the resource module (power components/structural support) as being completely
exterior to the ?ressurized components. Although the resource module must
perform. many functions, the oily human interfaces that occur seem to be at
initial checkout of the power components both before and after they are
deployed by the Shuttle and during maintenance. Present designs suggest that
the actual command and control of the power components will be accomplished
from the pressurized command/control module(s). Figure 4-4 provides the
high-level functional network for the resource module. A more detailed
functional breakdown is shown in Appendix A. Each function (cr event) for
each set of nodes is labeled in the figure. The characteristic times are
explained in the following paragraphs.
a.	 Power Module Network. Figure 4-4 shows that, after system
checkout, the control of power-related subsystems is done in parallel. This
is because of the interaction between subsystems. Any reboost capability,
although possibly related to load management, is usually associated with
maintaining earth orbit and is, therefore, not part of the power-control
portion of the network. The power-conditioning function occurs after power is
generated by one of the three (or all three) power subsystems. Load
management and data storage (far calculating the next Lower state or assessing
failures) occur in parallel. Once the data are received and stored, anomalies
or faults can be assessed. With the exception of system checkout and fault
management ;
 all the preceding deployment, control, conditioning, and
load-management fun(-tions are already largely automated in existing manned and
unmanned spacecraft and, therefore, only consume seconds or minutes (i.e., the
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time it takes for the on-orbit or ground crews to send or receive telemetered
signals and confirm function completio •,). The subsystem checkout function
(usually a ground-crew task) consumes pan average of 1 to 2 h. Fault
management has a wide time range and seams to vary from minutes (for simple
anomalies such as switches or fuses) to several hours per mission day (as
reported for Skylab I and II). The crew involvement in fault management as
extrapolated for Space Station woull se done from the command/control module
with EVA assistance as required (see Reference 4-5).
b.	 Command/Contro l Module Network. The command/control and
assembly module is more complex in terms of man-machine interface. Figure 4-5
provides the high-level functional n,Atwork for command/control functions with
each node-to-node task labeled. A n,re detailed network is shown. in
Appendix B. The first activity, p,-rform-mission scenario, is related to
changing the state of the spacecrafr as part of a planned mission (e.g.,
reboost, payload pointing, car satellite retrieval). The initiation of the
control process is a pre-planned sequence of switch activation, only requiring
a few seconds or ninu.:as (see Refe:ence 2-4). However, the monitoring and
verification activities that er° associated with command and control tasks
consume much more time. Pre3ently, tha monitoring function (Nodes 3 and 4) is
primarily done via ground c-A--rol. Loftus, in "An Historical Review of NASA
Manned Spacecraft Crew S`,at,,,ns," reports that about 70% of the monitoring
points are automatically telen:tered to ground control (Reference 4-7). The
remaining 30%, or approximately 1000 data elements, are monitored by the crew
on-board. Using a standard scan rate of 1 second per data element and a i2-h
monitoring cycle (ab confirmed by the Shuttle Operations personnel), a total
time of 0.6 it per mission day results (see Reference 4-6). If the monitoring
function were to be completely autonomous from the ground, existing procedures
would require an additional hour per day to complete the monitoring function.
The monitoring function often requires verification of an instrument
reading, recali.bration of an instrument, or adjustment of a servo position.
fhe verification/calibration function (Nodes 5 through 22) and data
storage/communication (Nodes 23 and 24) are more complicated because they
typically require more than one instrument reading, a comparison of data from
either ground control or other instruments on-board, and, possibly, a
spacecraft-control decision (Nodes 25 through 28), followed by a system
command and follow-up verification. Both Skylab and Shuttle operational
histories suggest that verification/calibration functions require about 0.•3
crew hours per function per day. Table 4-2 provides both an extrapolated
baseline list and time estimations of Space Station verification/calibration
and data-management types of tasks, based on present task experience and as
superimposed on the Space Station reference configuration. Again, the
parallel nature of the activities shown in Figure 4-5 is a result of subsystem
functional interactions.
The one area of special interest in ?able 4-2 is the experiment
calibration function, item (10). —At,is function was included as a
command!control function primarily because both Skylab and Shuttle are
designed so that the experiments are calibrated from the command/control
center and then actually initiated and performed in the lab module. The
amount of time required to verify and calibrate experiments depends upon the
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Table 4-2. Potential Space Station Verification/Calibration Functions
Functions/Tasks
(1) Plan mission
(2) Verify,,calibrate
inertial unit
(3) Verify/calibrate
docking system
(4) Verify/calibrate
accelerometers at
structural extremities,
and GN&C (e.g., global
positioning system, GPS)
(5) Verify/calibrate thermal
control systems
(6) Verify/calibrate
structural and
mechanical loads
(7) Verify/calibrate
station, experiment, and
platform pointing or
relative alignments
(8) Verify/calibrate power
subsystems
(9) Verify/calibrate ECLS
subsystems
00) Verify/calibrate
experiment instru-
mentation
(11) Verify/calibrate test
instrumentation on-board
(12) Parameter updates and
data storage in
preparation for
next verification/
calibration exercise
Descriptions
Planning and adjusting mission scenarics
Navigation attitude control (specifically
for traffic control)
Docking attitude, speed, and alignment
(specifically for traffic control)
Confirmation of acceptable impulse vibra-
tion levels for structural/experiment
loading; guidance navigation and orbital
reboost accuracy confirmation.
Confirmation of temperature readings in
pressurized areas, as well as at
structural extremities where experiments
are located; includes adjustment of
temperature control systems
Determination of relative movement of
Space Station structural end-points due
to thermal and inertial loading (speci-
fically applies to fine adjustments on
experiments and includes joint loading,
fluid coupling, drive loading, etc.)
Refers to maintenance of communication
links, proper pointing of station/
experiment instruments toward targets;
also applies to adjustments of experiment
or platform geometry to protect experi-
ment from thermal damage and provide for
maintenance access
Confirmation of load demands and proper
power distribution, fuel-tank crossover
management (essentially an instrument
scan/comparison accompanied by switching
as necessary)
Confirmation of habitat parameters
(contamination control ane management of
loads caused by crew movement/rotation)
Refers to actual instrument adjustment
process based on feedback from internal-
external station variables which
customer has not taken into account
when calibrating instrument on ground
(total time varies as function of number
of experiments)
Refers to maintenr-ice of instrument
accuracy for those instruments used for
test and verification of other on-board
measurement devices
Refers to updating the baselines of
various operational parameters for
use in next calibration activity
(primarily a keying-in/data manipulation
activity)
Approximate Time,
Crew h/day
0.5
0.3 (twice/day)
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
}
0.1
0.1
0.6 (IOC station
configuration will have
approxii:tateiy same number
of experiments as Skylab)
No value (function test
could be done on ground with
test/change-out of verifi-
cation instrumenta at the
90-day Shuttle rendezvous
interval)
0.1
TOTAL APPROXIMATE DAILY TINE
	 3.3 (4)
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number of experiments being conducted, the schedule or sequence for conducting
them, and the duration of the data-taking envelope. Although the average time
required for experiment verification or calibration on Skylab was about 0.6 h
per day, the experiment schedule on Space Station may eventually be more
intensive than either Skylab or Shuttle. Ccnsequently, the 0.6-h figure shown
in Table 4-2 may be conservative. Another area of interest related to the
payloads is the pointing and alignment function. Technical data received from
the Tracking Design Team during the July 1984 JSC Space Station Requirements
effort indicated concern over a demanding requirement to coordinate and
simultaneously point five of the planned experiments. Finally, the crew will
have to manage carrier frequency, signal fluctuation, and data-error anomalies
in the process of maintaining communication links with ground operations.
Verification/calibration types of functions may require that a command
and control decision be made, followed by a change in stace (Nodes 25 through
28) of a given subsystem or the station as a whole (e.g., change in station
attitude to allow for platform accommodation). As stated earlier, the
command/control function initiated by the station or ground crew is usually a
semi-automated function requiring minimal crew interface (i.e., initiation of
control sequences by switch activation). Therefore, it seems that the major
tax on the crew lies with (1) planning, monitoring, and verifying functions
that provide the inputs used in making command/control decisions and (2)
making the proper decisions, followed by the appropriate follow-up control
sequence.
Figure 4-5 shows that sometimes a command/control decision may require
more than a slight change in state of a subsystem. System anomalies and
failures both require troubleshooting and decision making concerning
	 z
corrective actions (Nodes 29 through 34). Both Skylab and Shuttle operational
	
a
logs indicate that the resolution interval can vary from 5 minutes to hours,
and in some cases days [for example, in the Skylab Control Moment Gyro (CMG)
problem). In some cases a failure is never resolved, thereby potentially
having a major impact on mission completion. The erratic behavior of the
Skylab CMGs is an excellent example of an unresolved failure that had a major
impact on the crew productive time and safety. Table 4-3 displays the major
system problems encountered on Skylab, along with relative frequencies.
Overall, Skylab experienced a system anomaly or failure on the average of once
every two mission days.
The anomalies or failures that fell in the 5- to 10-min repair category
were film/camera repairs, unjamming/sealing doors, and tape recorder repairs.
The difficult problems, moving the troubleshooting and repair times out to the
high end of the time spectrum, were the control moment gyros, coolant-system
leaks, and experiment problems. Oddly enough, control-panel light failures
could also fall into the high end of the repair-time spectrum because it is
often difficult to assess whether or not the actual failure is as simple as a
non-functioning light or a more serious downstream problem.
Analysis of all Space Shuttle failures has not been completed to date.
Therefore, only summary information is provided in this report. Table 4-4
displays the total number of in-flight anomalies or failures for 13 of the
Shuttle missions as a function of a major subsystem.
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Table 4-3. Major Skylab System Anomalies/Failures
f
	 Frequency (Failure/
Anomaly/Failure
	
Number of Mission Days)
i
w
-	 !	 Film processing/camera failure.	 1/12
f
i	 Control moment gyros	 1/13
Door failures (jammed, will not seal, etc.)	 1/17
Tape recorder/DAC failures 	 1/22
Leaks in coolant/condensate systems 	 1/22
Leaks in Apollo telescope coolant loop/power interrupt 	 1/35
Control panel lights not registering malfunction/
component status
	
1/35
Experimental equipment failures	 1/35
Overall, the more recent missions have experienced a major reduction in
failures (i.e., a reduction from an average of six anomalies, or failures per
mission day, to four). The Shuttle Quality Assurance Office reported that
over 13 flights, literally all avionics and instruments have failed at one
time or another; major structural/mechanical failures have impacted thermal
protection, brakes, and landing gear; software problems have usually involved
initiation formet errors caused by not reformating all other linked programs
when a reprogramming change was incorporated; electromechnical failures have
involved televisions cameras, recorders, printers, actuators, and door
mechanisms; fluid problems have included leaks in coolant system as well as
valve, pump, and fuel-cell failures; finally, electrical problems have
primarily encompassed heaters, thermostats, wiring, circuit breakers, and
switches.
Besides troubleshooting and repair activities associated with the
station itself, the on-board and external experiments will also require
periodic servicing. As shown in Table 4-3, Skylab experienced a small number
of "unscheduled" experiment problems. As a start toward identifying the
minimum experiment servicing requirements, Appendix C provides the "planned"
maintenance intervals for several of the experiments. The major concern here
is the potential frequency at which EVA may have to be used to service the
external station experiments and the platforms.
As indicated in the functional analysis of the resource (power) module,
the high frequency of anomalies/failures plus the substantial amount of time
required to deal with an anomaly suggest that troubleshooting and maintenance
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Table 4-4. Major Shuttle Anomalies/Failures
Total Number	 Frequency (Failures/
Major Subsystems	 of Failures	 Mission Day)
Instruments	 105	 2
Avionics
	
78	 1
Fluids	 72	 1
Structural/mechanical	 69	 1
Electromechanical	 42	 1
Electrical
	
38	 0.4
Software	 9	 0.1
are critical functions. It is for this reason that Figure 4-5 (Nodes 35, 36,
and 33) includes the use of a Remote Manipulator System (RMS) to facilitate
external repairs as an alternative or assist to EVA.
For purposes of assessing crew productivity impacts due to component
failures, the failure history provided in the preceding tables should be
divided into two components: (1) detailed component-failure frequencies and
(2) time required to resolve each type of failure. The product of these two
variables yields "repair hours/mission cycle." In terms of the methodology,
it is anticipated that this product can be obtained for various classes or
groups of components, (e.g., batteries, fuel cells, solar arrays, etc.) so
that, when aesessing automated fault management, the crew productivity savings
(in hours) can easily be established. This effort is addressed under
recommendations in Section VIII.
The last command/control function, docking (Nodes 37 and 38 in
Figure 4-5), is delineated in Appendix B. The basic Skylab or Shuttle
sequence is shown in Table 4-5.
It should be noted that Skylab docking experience indicated that about
twice the amount of time (8 to 10 h) was required for the complete docking
process. However, the Shuttle Operations group has suggested using the more
up-to-date data shown in Table 4-5 because improvements in technology and crew
training (especially through advancements in simulators) has greatly speeded
up the docking process. The key aspect of the docking process concerning the
productivity envelope is the fact that during docking maneuvers at least two
individuals are usually monitoring and performing command!control functions
for the full 4 to 7 hours. Although not a productivity problem under present
Shuttle operations, the planned biweekly or weekly Shuttle and orbital
maneuvering/orbital transport rendezvous and dockings could consume a sizable
amount of time using present procedures (Reference 4-8).
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Table 4-5. Top-Level Docking Functions
Functions	 Approximate Time, h
Rendezvous, maneuvering for course	 4 to 6
alignment, and visual location
Proximity maneuvering and closing	 0.5
of proximity gap
Fine alignment and hard docking	 0.1
Total Time
	
4.6 to 6.6
In closing this aspect of the network analysis, three caveats need to be
clearly stated. First, the preceding discussion concentrates primarily on
orbital operations and activities; however, ground-crew control, monitoring,
verification, and fault-management activities are basically duplications of
the orbital opt-, rations. Obviously, productivity time is not a key factor for
similar ground-functional networks because the ground crew is not directly
interfacing with the payloads and is not time-limited. More appropriately,
the key functional network drivers revolve around efficiency (to minimize
on-orbit delays while the ground crew performs a control function), and
conservation of ground support such as facilities and manpower. Second,
although feasible, it is not the intention of this methodology to address
reductions in Space Station crew size at this time. The assumption made in
this study is that the crew size will remain constant (between 5 to 7), with
increases in productivity adding to on-orbit experiment time.
Finally, there is a granularity problem in the to?k-time data. For
example, Table 4-2 displays a verification cr calibration time of C.' % for
the power module. However, Figure 4-4 shows the power module being composed
of several primary subsystems, such as solar arrays, batteries, fuel cells,
and power conditioning. Therefore, for this initial study, it is assumed that
the verification activity is equally distributed among all subsystems. This
is not considered a major problem at th's time because the Space Station
program is currently at a conceptual desiar. stage. Therefore, small errors in
task-time allocation are overshadowed by the fact that present cost estimates
for hardware and software are only approximations. This assumption enables
the remaining steps in the methodology to be developed. It is anticipated
that the networks can eventually be expanded to a more granular level by
drawing on detailed Shuttle operational logs and actual astronaut and
ground-crew experience.
D.	 SELECTION OF AUTOMATION CANDIDATES
The network analysis (Section IV-C) identifies key crew functions and
provides approximate task times for those functions. The last step in the
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network analysis is to identify prime automation candidates. This was done by
i establishing some subjective selection crite Ia, based on established human
engineering criteria, with guidance from the Shuttle astronauts via the JSC
Shuttle Operations Group.
r
	
	
Accepted human engineering standards suggest that the following criteria
(equally weighted) be used for determining when to automate functions
(References 4-9 and 4-10).
Automate:
(1) To avoid perceptual saturation.
(2) To reduce concurrent tasks.
(3) Tasks on compressed time lines.
(4) To avoid human bandwidth limitations.
(5) Routine tasks.
(6) Memorization tasks.
(7) Sequential and time tasks.
(8) Monitoring tasks.
(9) Time-consuming, boring, or unmotivating tasks.
(10) Emergency-prevention devices.
(11) Complex mathematical or logic tasks.
(12) Complex tasks that must be performed rapidly.
	
$	 1
(13) To enhance system reliability.
(14) Safety endangering tasks.
(15) Systems with consideration to crew acceptance.
However, these criteria are only a point of departure. Crew acceptance is
extremely important, as will become apparent in the following discussion.
Beginning with the power module, the network analysis indicated
subsystem checkout and fault repair as major man-machine interfaces.
Consideration is given to the fault-repair function first. Shuttle and Skylab
failure histories indicate that power anowali.es/failures occur about one every
2 and 17 mission days, respectively. Even though anomalies may not result in
actual component failures, they still require frequent monitoring and
troubleshooting, which detracts from the valuable 10-h customer productivity
envelope. Therefore, maintenance is a critical function. Shuttle and Skylab
operation logo report a rather wide variation in the time consumed in
correcting anomalies and failures. Repair times vary from 5 minutes to hours.
i
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iEVA has been suggested as the alternative for maintenance of power components
external to the pressurized modules. Although state-of -the-art, the EVA
function is extremely time-consuming (i.e., 3 to 4 hours is usually required
for pre-preparation planning activities, donning and checking out the
yu_;^pnr, and de -araparation activities). Additionally, EVA does have
several hazards associated with it (e.g., 4ari able pressure environments,
potential suit punctures, or uncontrolled decoupling from the spacecraft).
Out of the above list of criteria, items (3), (9), (11), and (14) apply
directly. Item ( 3) applies because EVA is a time-limited activity. Item (11)
is germa :ie because troubleshooting anomalies or faults can be a complex
process of elimination. Item (9) applies because EVA is time -consuming; item
(14) applies because of the hazards associated with EVA. The key thrust here
is that the EVA function is not eliminated, but reduced in freo ,uency.
Therefore, it seems that fault management is a good automation candidate. As
a bonus, if fault management were automated, then it seems that the subsystem
checkout function might be simplified for either on-orbit or ground crews.
Similarly, the mission monitoring, verification, fault-management, and
docking activities controlled from the command/control modules can be
evaluated. Table 4-2 suggests that both monitoring and verification/
calibration types of functions could consume about 40% to 50% of the 10-h
available productive time. Information received from the Shuttle Operations
Planning Group suggests that (with the exception of experiments) monitoring,
verifying, and calibrating types of functions are considered repetitive and
time -consuming by the crew and, therefore, good candidates for automation.
Additionally, verification tasks can run in parallel ( see Figure 4-5) and so
pose a sizable amount of information sorting and assimilation problems.
Automation of both monitoring and verification/calibration tasks would be in
accord with items (1), (2), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), and (11) and, in
addition, have strong crew support. In the case of experiments, the sheer
quantity may make the verification and calibration functions unmanageable
without the help of automated monitoring and calibration devices. However,
care will have to be taken when assessing automation concepts for this area
for the following reasons:
(1) The potentially large number of nonroutine tasks may make the	 r
function difficult and costly to automate._
(2) There may be potential interface problems associated with having
to monitor, collect, and compare a vast array of different
experimental variables and data formats.
(3) There could be a constantly changing variety of experiments.
Automation of the fault-management tasks for the command/control module follows
the same logic related to the power module. The mission-planning and
rendezvous ( or maneuvering) docking tasks had interesting outcomes when
measured against the automation criteria. Mission-planning and maneuver-
initiation tasks are at opposite ends of the time spectrum. Mission planning
requires much more time than activating a switch for a reboost maneuvering
command. The planning task requires consideration of many different control
variables, trade -offs, and time windows. Items (1), (2), (3), (4), and (11)
plus crew support make this task a reasonable candidate for automation.
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Similarly, although the time required to initiate a maneuver is small,
consideration of numerous control variables and time windows makes planning
and maneuvering similar. Nevertheless, the astronauts voiced concern over
giving up manual control. Tasks, such as reboost or maneuvering for thermal
control, are considered too critical for the crew to relinquish. Clearly,
this is an area that requires further definition. Discussions with the
Shuttle Operations Group indicate that the final tine alignment and vehicle
docking sequence are the two functions the crew specifically wishes to
control. The several hours of rendezvous monitoring fit nicely under items
(S), (6), ( 7 ), (8), and (9) of the automation criteria.
In summary, monitoring, verification/calibration, fault isolation/
management, EVA, mission planning, rendezvous, and limited aspects of
station-state changes are strong automation candidates. It is recognized that
varying degrees of decision making, man-machine interface, and perceptual
interpretation are required for the same tasks in different Space Station
modules. However, at a subsystem level, there is consistency among tasks
because all modules require the same basic subsystems. The network analysis
is performed at a sufficient level of detail so that each of the automation
candidates can be associated with the various Space Station subsystems
identified. As an overview, Table 4-6 relates each selected automation
function with its applicable subsystem within the overall system hierarchy,
shown in Figure 4-3. This table (Table 4-6) provides a map showing which
functions appear reasonable to automate within each subsystem. For example,
automation of potential EVA activities (such as module changeout or in-place
maintenance) is attached to the power, propulsion, thermal (radiators),
structures, and external payloads because these subsystems are largely external
to the pressurized areas of the station. Similarly, automation of the mission-
planning function is associated primarily with the communication/tracking,
data handling, crew systems, and payload (i.e., sequencing and initiating
experiments) subsystems.
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SECTION L
AUT01ATIUN CONCEPTUAL I)ESIGN DEVELOPMENT
A. OVERVIEW
Section IV demonstrates how functions and tasks are assembled into
networks that (along with task times, s reference configuration, and sound
selection criteria) allow a determination of prime automation candidates.
Once the candidate functions have been identified, the next step is to
establish conceptual automation designs for each candidate that provide
insight into the potential coeta of automation. Section V describes the
conceptual design approach used, along with the associated costing
techniques. Additionally, the array-limiting technique for establishing an
efficient set of man-machine alternatives is described. Examples of the
design, cost, and efficient set principles are provided where data were
available.
B. HIERARCHICAL DESIGN APPROACH
The hierarchical design approach is defined in Section I and graphically
depicted in Figure 4-2. This avenue was selected because (1) proper automated
system design is hierarchical in nature, providing an understanding of
subsystem decoupling and dependencies (see Reference 2-1) and (2) automation
candidates and related conceptual designs can be conveniently merged for
purposes of modeling the complete system. In developing automation design
concepts, it is extremely important first to establish the basic functional
architecture. Next, functions are mapped into an implementation architecture.
Finally, functions are distributed to resources at different levels. Resources
include components, such as processors, ac •.uators, sensors, end-effectors, or
thrusters. When identifying and distriL _ing functions, it is extremely
important to understand where concurrent processes are taKiag place. Func-
tional networking early in the design process (as demonstrated in Section IV)
coupled with design experience helps to highlight the interdependent, or
concurrent, processes. The last element, experience, is where the use of a
conceptual design team comes into play. This is a pivotal consideration
because of the system-level impacts of interdependent functions (see
Reference 2-1). Besides mapping the concurrent processes, it is also _mportant
to establish intercommunication links, possible closed-loop processes (e.g.,
at the dedicated microprocessor level), software requirements (e.g., simple
versus complex), and fault management. It should be noted that, for ease of
costing and cost-benefit assessment, it is usually more benefizial to establish
a conceptual design for maximum automation first. This approach facilitates
segregation of the various functions to determine how the design, could be
simplified if certain functions were allocated to the crew. Experience with
the storage battery and rendezvous/docking examples used for this study
suggest that the difference between functional allocations to the crew and
machines revolves primarily around software complexity (References 5-1 and
5-2). Figure 5-1 shows a sample hierarchical allocation of functions within
the power module and demonstrates how functions are associated with tl.eir
hardware counterparts.
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For modeling Space Station automation impacts, the functions are
developed first, followed by the hardware/software concept. It is for this
reason that the hierarchical modeling network introduced earlier in Sectiun IV
(see Figure 4-2) was designed to be equivalent to the spacecraft automation
design framework shown in Figure 5-1. This equivalence allows a rapid
transfer of functions to hardware components, followed by translation into
costs and trade-offs. Figure 5-2 graphically depicts toe similarities between
the modeling and design frameworks.
It is important to understand that, although the methodology
conceptually attaches man-machine functions to the subsystem level, this does
not imply that the subsystem level is the only place where functions such as
monitoring, verification, or fault management are performed. Indeed, the same
functions can be applied to Levels 2 and above. The methodology was so
designed because it is at this level of granularity where (1) actual
historical ta.k-time data are available and (2) the various data elements
related to tasks, such as monitoring or fault isolation, are collected and
displayed to the station or ground crews. Consequently, it is easier to
understand the detailed functions and associated blocks of time required to
perform various tasks. This understanding clarifies the design complexity
needed to automate and prioritize the same tasks (see Table 4-2). For
conceptual design purposes, a good idea of the required hardware and software
can usually be obtained at Level 3.
In terms of the basic tasks addressed in the preceding paragraph, the
complexity and subsequent perceptual overload usually increases as Level 0 is
approached. For example, assume that an anomaly or failure has occurred
within the solar arrays (the primary power source) and that the backup storage
batteries and fuel cells are being depleted. To manage the thermal and power
loads until the anomaly can be resolved, the spacecraft may have to draw on
its reboost, guidance, navigation, and control subsystems to reorient the
spacecraft to a safe configuration to minimize the drain or. the backup power
sources. This maneuver would be a system-level function (probably exercised
from the command/control module) because of the interdependency of the various
subsystems. The basic monitoring and verification functions would remain the
same, but the fault--management function would then reflect a much greater
station or ground-crew involvement (the time required to manage the fault
would increase greatly). From a conceptual design and cost viewpoint, the
problem would become a matter of deciding, where to place (or distribute) the
control for the system-level fault management. If the =ost (or risk) of
automating this specific problem. is considered too high, then a hybrid
combination of automation and crew involvement might achieve the same end
(e.g., the system might continue to do the monitoring, verification, and load
management at the power subsystem level, with the crew performing the
maneuvering, major fault management, and power shedding at the system level
until a safe state is reached). This hybrid combination would represent one
man-machine alternative for solving the control problem.
As stated earlier, a Level 3 conceptual design is usually sufficient to
establish order-of-magnitude cost for automation hardware and software. As an
example, Figure 5-3 shows a conceptual design for automating the monitoring,
verification, and fault-management functions associated with the storage
battery subsystem on Space Station (see Reference 5-1).
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Figure 5-3 illustrates the distributed microprocessor configuration to
implement the battery monitoring, verification, and fault-management
functions. Starting on the left of the figure, the first microprocessor
monitors and controls the power-source components [solar arrays, batteries,
fuel cell, battery chargers (reconditioning) and boost converters); the middle
microprocessor monitors and controls the power conditioning (boost regulators,
signal invert ,!cs/converters); and the far right microprocessor monitors and
controls the power distribution. The central integrating processor manages
the power margin, subsystem-level computations/fault-management decisions, and
data communication to the command/control centers. The local (or dedicated)
microprocessors must have sufficient storage capacity to manage simple
anomalies (e.g., switching) and allow the integrating processor to tap their
data banks and assess potential. problems. Although the integrating processor
is shown here with the battery subsystem, it will integrate data for the other
power components, and so its cost will be shared among other power
subsystems. The total software, because it is shown encompassing ether power
elements, will probably not exceed the battery management package by much.
The use of one integrating processor for all three power subsystems underlines
the point made earlier in this report concerning the importance of the
conceptual-design step in identifying economies of scale. As shown in Figure
5-3, the solar arrays, batteries, and fuel cells represent the Level 2
functions; the dedicated (or local) microprocessors perform the Level 3
functions; and the central integrating processor supports the Level 1
functions. The basic sensor and control data for each level are also listed.
The automated rendezvous and docking concept, which is the other
automation test case referred to in Section, IV-C, has just started and is
presently in the functional allocation stage. The results of this first
research stage are shown in Appendix D (JPL IUM from J. Matijevic, "Automation
of the Rendezvous and Docking Functions," August 1984).
In the following paragraphs, the battery example is pursued to
demonstrate how such a system is coated at the conceptual-design stage.
C.	 IDENTIFICATION AND COSTING OF AUTOMATION CONCEPTS
As stated in Section III, the conceptual design effor t provides
estimates of:
(1) The number of dedicated microprocessors and integrating networks.
(2) Dedicated and integrating communication links.
(3) Required software.
(4) Potential software complexity.
(5) The number and types of additional sensors, backup
microprocessors, etc., needed for fault management.
Each of the battery automation components was described in the
subsections. As a departure point for the costing discussion,
components of the automated battery design are listed in Table
the preceding five estimates.
5-6
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Table 5-1. Battery Automation Components
Component	 Number Required
Dedicated microprocessors	 3
Integrating processors	 1
Dedicated communication links
	 10
Simple software programs	 3
Complex software programs	 1
Additional sensors	 None
Contemporary dedicated microprocessor technology is capable of handling
the power monitoring and switching for a large number of batteries
(Reference 5-3). Furthermore, because the concept was breadboarded and
tested, the complexity of the software was calibrated. In the case of the
dedicated microprocessors, the software was considered standard and,
therefore, was not considered a new software requirement (see Reference 5-1).
The integrating software was more complicated but was still considered well
within the state of the art of on-board computational capability. The
dedicated communication link3 are primarily between the microprocessors and
	
power components and between microprocessors. The power sensor 	 configurations
	 s
on present spacecraft would suffice for supporting the microprocessor
hierarchy; therefore, no additional sensor data are required. One interesting
aspect of Table 5-1 is that the additional components required to automate the
battery functions conform closely with the observation made by Turner (see
Reference 5-2): Given that present spacecraft designs already require the
sensor, actuator, and system-level communication framework to be in place for
the crew, the basic additional components for automation are processors and
software.
Once a reasonable conceptual design is in place, the costing process can
commence. The standard approach to life-cycle cost may be used to estimate
the present value cost of automation (References 5-4 and 5-5). It should be
noted that the following equation represents incremental costs because only
select automated crew functions are examined within each subsystem and
module.
n	 n	 n
CIr^	
a	
`'I. E COS.	 (5-1)
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where
CLC - incremental life-cycle cost associated with automating
subsystem, i, for a given man-machine alternative
C I - initial incremental cost associated with automating
subsystem, i
COS - incremental operations and support (recurring) costs
associated with automating subsystem, i
CI can further be divided into the following incremental cost components:
CI - CRDP + CTR + CMP + CLSTE + CS + CTD + CF	 (5-2)
where, for a given man-machine alternative for subsystem, i,
CRDp - cost of R&D and production; this cost includes the
hardware, software, communication, and additional sensor
elements
CTR - cost of on-orbit and ground-crew training if subsystem functions
not completely automated
CMp - cost of on-orbit and ground manpower; on-orbit workforce costs
are reduced by the value of crew hours saved, and ground
workforce is composed of system-maintenance/support for test and
mission-control personnel
CLSTE - cost of launch support and test equipment (launch support refers
to consideration of launch weight constraints, and test equipment
refers to special test, verification, calibration or tooling
hardware)
CS - cost of initial and follow-on spares
CTD - cost of supporting technical documentation for training or
maintenance
CF - cost of facilities, such as building space, computers, and
ground-crew displays
and
COS - CMP + CTR + CSTE + CS + CTD + CM	(5-3)
where, for a given man-machine alternative for subsystem, i,
CMp - cost of on-orbit and ground manpower; on-orbit workforce costs
are reduced by the value of crew hours saved, and ground
workforce is composed of system-maintenance and mission-control
personnel
f
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iCTR i cost of on-orbit and ground-crew training if subsystem functions
t	
not completely automated
i
	
CSTE	 cost of support and test equipment, exclusive of CLSTE
Cg s cost of initial and follow-on spares
	
CTD	 cost of supporting technical documentation for training or
maintenance
CM - cost of maintenance (primarily the recurring retrofit and ground
maintenance costs associated with the repair of failed components
and associated software)
At this stage of the research, it sufficed merely to identify the
various IOC and operations and support coat elements and mathematically define
the incremental nature of each element with respect to the overall structure
of the cost-benefit methodology. Specific attention was given to the R&D and
production-cost variable because early results from the battery and
rendezvous/docking examples suggest software could be a major cost driver.
Additionally, there seems to be a wide variation in opinion about how software
can be coated. For the baseline conceptual design, the processor hardware
costs are rather straightforward, with data obtainable from the computer
industry. Volume 3 of ARAMIS will be helpful in identifying and costing
automation technology components. Cost-bridging estimates (covering R&D to
production) will be obtained from the private-sector data. Estimations of
software costs require a sub-model within the life-cycle cost variable,
CRDp. A point of departure for developing this sub-model is the embedded
COCOMO software model (Reference 5-6). The COCOMO model seems appropriate for
this application because it is based on a substantial empirical database and
provides development costs and schedules relevant to complex, tightly
regulated systems that pose substantial safety hazards (e.g., nuclear
reactors). Furthermore, because the overall Space Station program has just
been initiated, data rates and quantities can only be described credibly as
large or small, simple or complex. The COCOMO structure provides a means of
converting subjective software requirements into preliminary cost estimates.
For example, in the case of the battery example, the dedicated microprocessors
and integrating processor would be respectively rated as small to medium
(2-32KDSI) and large to very large (128-500KDSI). The term "KUSI" refers to
thousands of lines of Delivered Source Instructions. Using "embedded"
equations, Boehm (see Reference 5-6) developed the following estimate of the
cost in workmonths, called manmonths (MM) in Boehm's equations, required to
write the software:
Dedicated microprocessors (reasonably simple software): MM - 3.6 (KDSI)1.2
(5-4)
Integrating microprocessor (complex software): MM - 5.4 (KDSI) 1.2	(5-5)
For the battery example the preceding equations and associated data quantities
(32K for the dedicated processors and a mid-point value of 200K for the
integrating processors) yield the following results for initial software coat:
5-9
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MM - 3.6 (320 1.2 - 230.4 (19 manyears)
MM - 5.4 (2000 1.2 - 2160 (180 manyears)
Total manyears - 3(19) + 180 - 237 manyears
The cost of the software is easily determined by multiplying programming
effort by the cost per workyear (called manyear in Boehm's equations above)
for programming. The COCOMO model also provides estimates of the amount of
time necessary to develop the software. Additionally, the following equations
were developed for the recurring software maintenance cost for a given
man-machine option in subsystem, is
EDSI i - ADSIi ^	 (5-7)
where
EDSI = Expected number of Delivered Source Instructions
ADSI - Adapted number of Delivered Source Instructions (this is the
original DSI figure)
AAF - Adaptation Adjustment Factor
in which
AAF - 0.4 DM + 0.3 CM * 0.3 IM	 (5-8)
where
DM - % design modified
CM - % code modified
D4 = % integration required for modified software
Based on the embedded COCOMO criteria for the DM, CM, and IM variables, which
seem applicable to the Space Station environment, the calculated AAF values
for any dedicated and integrating microprocessors used in automation concepts
would be 21 and 74, respectively. The new EDSI value replaces the KDSI value
in Equations (5-4) and (5-5).
Once the primary cost variables have been identified, it is possible to
provide a hardware and software cost estimate (CRDp) for the battery
example. The hardware estimates in Table 5-2 are based on Electronic Memories
and Magnetics (EMM) Corporation and INTEL Corporation figures for space-
qualified, central-processing units [Model 80286 (integrating processor) and
8086 (dedicated processor) CPUs) and associated software support (Personal
Communications from J. Wilkins, Electronic Memories and Magnetics Corporation,
and K. Smith, INTEL Corporation, Hardware Quotes, September 1984; also
Reference 5-7). The software estimates assume a conservative programmer
salary of $50,000 per workyear (manyear) (see Reference 5-7).
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Table 5-2. Battery Example initial Costs (CRDp)
Actual Cost,
Considering
{ Reductions
{ Cost, Assuming New due to APSMa
Component Software Required Findings
Three dedicated microprocessors $75 to $120K Same
t	
One integrating processor $30 to $50K (mean $40K) Same
(1/3)
	 ($40K)
Communication links and $30K Same
support hardware (text
editor, program debugger,
compiler, discs,
	 etc.)
Dedicated microprocessor $2.$M 0
9	 software
:.	 e
Integrating software (1/3)	 ($9M) $3M
4
Total (approximate)
i
$6M $3M
aAutomated Power System Management (see Figure 5-3).
Table 5-2 shows a total capital of investment of $3 to $6 million,
depending on whether the software is already in place. The one-third factor
included f ,)r the integrating processor and software costs reflects the
amortization of cost across the solar arrays and fuel cells. One important
observation about Table 5-2 is that the software costs seem to be much greater
than the hardware costs. As a point of reference, also note that the
projected hardware and software costs are on the order of predictions for
next-generation power subsystems arriving in the 1990 time frame (see
Reference 5-1). Because of the potential magnitude of the software
investment, software costing will continue to be a key research thrust in the
next phase.
D.	 INITIAL LIMITING OF AUTOMATION ALTERNATIVES
The last step in this section describing the methodology is to use the
productivity and cost variables to help pare the potential array of man-machine
mixes to those that offer the best productivity payoff for a given cost. To
accomplish this segregation, a parametric mathematical program was formulated
that maximized productivity (crew time saved) subject to a cost constraint:
Because cost is varied over its full range for the complete array of man-
machine functional alternatives, a set of efficient solutions can be generated.
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Notationally, let i (i - 1, ... ,m) be the function index, and xi be a
zero or one decision variable. This implies that there are, at most, m
man-machine alternatives for each subsystem. The problem to be solved is:
E
m
Max 	 Pixi, subject to
	 (5-9)
x
i-1
m
C 1 (x) x i < C	 (5-10)
1-1
where
P - incremental crew hours saved if function i is automated
x - automation decision variable for function i, having a value of 1
if the function is automated and 0 if the function is not
C(x) - net incremental life-cycle cost for automating function i
C - cost of the most expensive man-machine alternative (i.e.,
that altr:native in which all functions are to be automated)
When xi - 0, the default option with respect to the current baseline
results. Constraint (5-10) implies that the net life-cycle cost associated
with automating a given subsystem can be no more than C dollars. C will
initially be set at the lowest value that would make the most expensive
alternative feasible (this would not necessarily be the full automation
alternative represented by xi - 1; i - 1, ... ,m) and then be parametrically
reduced until infeasibility is reached. The resulting solutions are then
recorded. It should be noted that a systemic contraint exists that may
include or exclude certain combinations. For example, if the selection of the
second alternative for function 1 can be replaced by a more likely third
alternative involving both function 1 and function 2, the second alternative
would be dropped from the alternative array. This constraint helps make the
selection of the efficient subset even easier to solve if, in fact, certain
automated functions are linked. Using this approach, one can concisely
develop the full array of possible man-machine alternatives for a given
subsystem. The array might appear as shown in Table 5-3, which lists
man-machine alternatives for battery monitoring, verifying, and fault-
management functions within the command/control module. A man-machine
alternative is defined as "that function or set of functions that is to be
automated within a subsystem."
A certain number of solutions obtained from Equation (5-9) by
parametrically varying the right-hand side of Equation (5-10) will be
discarded, leaving an efficient set of alternatives with respect to cost and
productivity. The rationale for using Equation (5-9) to filter out the less
i
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tie Alternatives for the Battery Example
Functions
Man-Machine
Alternatives	 Monitor	 Verify	 Fault Manage
1 (Baseline)	 0	 0	 0
2 la 0	 0
3 0 1	 0
4 0 0	 1
5 1 1	 C
6 0 1	 1
7
-t
1 0	 1
8 (Total automation) 1 1	 1
aWhere 0 means no automation, and 1 means the function is automated.
desirable alternatives is based on the fact that the reliability, weight, and	 t,
power measures have already been incorporated in the COOL, productivity, and
safety attributes; and that safety is typicaliy affected by automation in a
positive sense. Note that it would be inappropriate to constrain weight,
power, and cost in this stage of the analysis; such a constraint would
ultimately limit the abiliL• y to conduct system-level trade-offs.
i
Should it appear that safety is being sacrificed in favor of cost 	 4W
reduction or higher 7roductivity, Equation (5-9) could be replaced by, or
examined in conjunctiock with, an objective function emphasizing safety. The
parametric analysis would 'hen be repeated to obtain a supplementary set of
efficient solutions. The saicty objective function might be "exposure-time
reduction."
To demonstrate the technique more fully, consider the set of example
battery values for the previous array of Haan-machine alternatives in
Table 5-4. The productivity impacts assume that each of the monitoring,
verification, and fault-management task times :re evenly distributed across
the four key power subsystems (as stated in Secticn IV). This results in
about 0.01 h/mission day for monitoring, 0.03 h/mission day for verification/
calibration, and 0.03 h/mission day for fault management (mainly switching
batteries). The cost values approximate relative software differences.
y,	 Figure 5-4 shows a plot of each alternative's cost and productivity values.
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Table 5-4. Sample Cost and Productivity Values for Battery Example
Approximate Cost,	 Crew-Hoar Savings,
Man-Machine Alternative	 $ million	 h/mission day
1 0 0
2 1 0.01
3 1 0.03
4 6 0.03
5 2 0.04
6 6 0.06
7 6 0.04
8 6 0.07
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6
	
7
COST,
ALTERNATIVE (1) 	 05  3 MILLIO
Figure 5-4. Man-Machine Alternative Cost and Productivity Plot
(Numbers in Parentheses Correspond to the Automation
Alternatives Listed in Table 5-4)
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Clearly, Alternatives (4), (6), and (7) are inferior because it is
difficult to automate fault isolation without having the software in place
to monitor and verify. Alternative (2) is inferior because mere automation
of the monitoring function does not enhance crew productivity signficantly.
Thus, Alteruatives (1), (3), (5), and (8) represent the efficient subset. The
efficient subset is probably composed of only three alternatives because
Alternative (3) actually fits the previous systemic constraint: one would
most likely not automate verification without automating monitoring as well.
Although this example is rather simple, it illustrates the principle of the
efficient subset. If sufficient task-time data were available, the array of
man-machine alternatives could be expanded to consider shades of man-machine
involvement in the fault-management task (i.e., segregation of system-level,
fault-management functions from subsystem functions). After identification of
an efficient subset of man-machine mixes, the final step in the methodology is
to consider the complete array of cost, productivity, and safety attributes
with the intent of optimizing both the system man-machine mix (as a function
of the net automation benefits) and the affiliated technology growth plot.
The attribute measures are provided in Section VI, followed by the optimization
discussion in Section VII.
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SECTION VI
t
ATTRIBUTE UTILITY MEASURES
A. OVERVIEW
Section III defines each of the various design and cost attributes in
detail and provides a description of multi-attribute decision analysis.
Section V refers to the final optimization step whereby the different
attributes are weighed simultaneously so that various subsystem man-machine
alternatives, or technology options, can be rank-ordered as a function of
their desirability. In the case of man-machine alternatives, the
multi-attribute decision technique provides an additional screening mechanism
by which to simplify the final system-level optimization process. As
applicable to the best technology plot, multi-attribute decision analysis
allows consideration of less quantitative factors such as "importance to
out-year missions" or "ease of retrofit." Paramount to exercising the
multi-attribute decision technique is the development of a decision framework
that supports a set objective(s) (i.e., selection of the best man-machine
mixes and automation technologies). This decision framework implies that the
attributes must be displayed both as a function of cost (where feasible), and
relative utility. The concept of "utility" can extend beyond cost to more
subjective measures. This section (Section VI) focuses on extending the
definition of the set of attributes in terms of their relative utilities. The
first part of this section explains the concept of the decision framework and
its desirable properties. The second and central part of Section VI describes
the development of objectives for Space Station automation assessment,
including considerable discussion of the criteria and attribute measures in
terms of utility. The final part of this section discusses how these
attributes were used in the first application of the automation assessment
methodology.
B. ATTRIBUTE DEFINITION
The assessment of automation for Space Station will lead to decisions
concerning system and subsystem levels of autonomy. Each automation decision
	 L
involves consideration of several factors or attributes simultaneously. Such
a decision can be difficult to make because not all attributes can be reduced
to one common denominator (e.g., costs and cost savings).
To facilitate decisions with several attributes, a useful construct is a
progressive structure of objectives, criteria, and attributes. An objective
structure provides a means for individuals cons.dered knowledgeable in
spacecraft design and automation to express their preferences among different
man-machine alternatives or technology options. These responsible individuals
are viewed as the decision makers.
Further, the structure enables quantification of the results or outcomes
associated with each man-machine or technology option. Quantification draws
on well-developed and tested methods of decision analysis (e.g., see
References 6-1 and 6-2).
6-1
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1.	 Overview of Objectives Structure
The objectives framework expresses the preferences of the decision
makers in ever-increasing detail as one proceeds down through the hierarchy
from overall objective to a lower-level of subobjectives. Below the
subobjectives are "criteria," which must permit a qualifiable measure of the
various man-machine alternatives or technology options with respect to
subobjectives. Associated with each criterion is an "attribute," the actual
measure of the criteria that allows the decision makers to express preferences
for its various states. Figure 6-1 shows the objective structure and
associated attributes (introduced earlier) for the Space Station problem.
Besides facilitating the cost analysis, the set of attributes jointly
satisfies the following established decision elements needed to characterize
the preference structure of the decision makers in the utility model (see
Reference 6-1):
(1) Completeness: The set of attributes reasonably characterizes most
of the factors crucial to the Space Station programmatic decisions.
(2) Comprehensiveness: Each attribute adequately characterizes its
associated criterion.
(3) Importance: Each attribute represents a significant criterion in
programmatic decision making (at least in the sense that the
attribute has the potential for affecting the preference ordering
of the alternatives under consideration) and can, therefore,
affect the ranking of man-machine alternatives or technology
options.
(4) Measurability: Each attribute is capable of being objectively or
subjectively measured.
(5) Familiarity: Each attribute is understandable to the decision
makers in the sense that they can identify preferences for
different states of the attribute.
(6) Nonredundacy: Two attributes do not measure the same criterion,
thus resulting in double counting.
(7) Independence: The value model is so structured that changes
within certain limits in the state of one attribute do not affect
the preference ordering for states of another attribute.
Several pragmatic properties ire demonstrated by the objectives
structure. Most important, the structure leads to an appropriate ranking of
man-machine or technology alternatives that accurately reflects the
preferences of the decision maker. Next, the framework is reasonably easy to
apply. Ease of application is critical to ranking options within interview
time and trip cost limitations. Some aspects of ease of use include:
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(1) The ease with which experts (decision makers) can provide
preferences for the decision model.
(2) Ease of obtaining performance data for alternatives relevant to
the attributes.
(3) Ease of carrying out a sensitivity analysis on the rankings and
understanding underlying reasons behind observed shifts in
preferences.
2. Discussion of Objectives and Subobjectives
The top level in Figure 6-1 is an overall statement of the
objective, namely "assess Space Station, man-machine, or technology options."
This objective considers both initial operational capability and future
mission needs.
The subobjectives provide distinct categories for the components of the
overall objective. These components are chosen to support and facilitate
further definition of the objectives. The categories for the subobjectives
that apply directly to Space Station include economic, operational, technical
objectives, and safety.
3. Subobjective Criteria
The level below subobjectives contains criteria. The criteria
selected permit the quantification of performance of the alternatives with
respect to the subobjectives. For example, cost is a logical candidate for
the criterion related to measuring the economic Subobjective.
4.	 Attributes and Utility Measures
At the lowest level in the hierarchy are the attributes, which
provide a measure of each criterion and a means of displaying relative
differences between man-machine alternatives or technology options to the
decision makers. For example, weight in kilograms may be a performance or
utility measure with respect to the resource consumption criterion in
Figure 6-1. This display of attributes can aid decision makers to establish
preferences for an alternative based on their knowledge of budget limitations
or programmatic needs. Although the attributes are discussed in Section III,
they are reviewed here from the perspective of utility to the decision maker.
The cost attributes are the first elements shown in Figure 6-1. The
division of cost into two attributes is noteworthy. Major technology cost
decisions, as demonstrated in Section V, usually take both initial cost and
recurring (or operating) cost into account. With Space Station, cost at
initial operational capability has been widely discussed as significant
because of stringent budget constraints. Also, the continuing cost of
operation and new technology, as Space Station missions materialize, is
significant for setting the level of automation. Life-cycle cost per mission
period is, therefore, a reasonable comprehensive measure of continuing, or
6-4
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operating, cost. As a basis of comparison for each man-mnchine alternative or
technology, present value costs are used.
The attributes of weight in kilograms and power consumption in kilowatts
are significant to the choice of automation. This significance is attributed
to the weight and power limitations placed on the Space Station with respecc
to payload weight limitations of the Shuttle (which will ferry Space Station
components) and to the general desire to simplify the design by keeping power
consumption down. For example, if the experts learn that automation choices
are driven largely by software (which has little weight impact), then the
weight attribute would not have significant impact on the choices of
man-machine alternatives or technology options.
The attribute measure for productivity savings through automation is
suggested to be in available crew hours per day. Both ground crew and Space
Station crew hours could be included although the primary focus will be on the
on-board crew. The utility of additional on-orbit time revolves around the
crew being able to tend more payloads. Ground-crew reductions clearly have
utility by cutting operating costs.
Automation, with its implications of fault tolerance, self-testing,
error correction and system redundancy has an important relationship with
system reliability. Several different measures of reliability are (1) mean
time between failures, (2) mean time to repair, (3) probability of failure,
and (4) expected downtime in hours per day (or per mission cycle). The last
of these, expected downtime in hours per day, is suggested as the appropriate
utility measure for reliability because it provides a clear understanding of
operational impacts, as well as being easily translated into cost.
Technical risk is an important consideration in automation selection.
Included in this consideration are technology availability, importance of
out-year missions, and amenability to retrofit. Although technical problems
can be overcome, giver enough time and money, time delay beyond IOC in years
has both schedule and cost connotations to the decision maker. Importance of
new technology to out-year missions also has schedule and cost overtones to
program managers. The ease with which new technology can be incorporated
(retrofit amenability) can pose a cost dilemma to program managers and
suggests possible limitations in meeting future missions 4-f retrofit requires
major system reconfiguration.
Safety, the last attribute in Figure 6-i, is an extremely important
consideration in assessing automation and eventual autonomy for the Space
.tation. In many other technology selection problems, safety is treated by a
subjectively scaled attribute (with word description of different safety
levels). In the case of Space Station, the utility of safety improvements
through automation can be related to the reduction in exposure time of the
crew to potentially hazardous situations, such as EVA. Loss of life, or
injury, can have cost ramifications in terms of jeopardizing program
continuation. However, to the decision maker, the political and social value
of crew safety is more visible. Reduction in exposure is, therefore, a more
reasonable utility measure of automation.
i
I
t
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C.	 REFINEMENT AND USE OF ATTRIBUTES
The ten attributes presented in Section V were selected to capture the
essence of the automation assessment problem. Also, the set of attributes was
carefully defined to fit well with the multi-attribute decision analysis
described in Section VII. The units of measure were selected to allow careful
expression of an individual's preferences, yet not make technical data
requirements impractical. The set of ten attributes will be reviewed as
technical data are gathered to ensure that the set of attributes is clearly
described for the decision makers. The re •:icw also provides direction for
setting the scale for each attribute. Each attribute scale includes an upper
and lower bound on the unit of measure and is wide enough to delineate cost
and performance values of the range of man-machine and technology options
under consideration.
The first application of multi-attribute decision analysis is for
optimization of the man-machine mix at the subsystem level. For this
application all attributes, except safety, crew productivity, and the three
attributes related to technology risk, are con.bined into a single, net dollar
savings, or cost. The attributes related to risk are reserved for the
technology assessment. Therefore, the decision makers are initially asked to
weigh only three attributes. In the case of weighing technology options, all
ten attributes are used in the assessment. Both processes are described in
detail in Section V:I.
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SECTION VII
COST-BENEFIT STRUCTURE
A. OVERVIEW
Optimization of large-scale systems often relies on hierarchical or
decomposition methods to transpose the analytical model into a computationally
manageable form. Much of the recent work in this area has focused on
applications dealing with production planning and multicommodity distribution
(e.g., References 7-1, 7-2, and 7-3). Because most real systems embody
several conflicting or different objectives, it has become evident that
multiobjective optimization must be part of any successful decomposition
scheme (References 7-4, 7-5, and 7 -6). In recognition of this fact, a
two-stage approach was developed. The first stage, selecting a subset of
efficient man-machine alternatives, is discussed in Section V. In Section VII
the second stage is developed as a resource allocation problem, which is
solved using the empirical ( cost) and subjective ( safety) data elements of the
efficient subset as the decision variables. The objective is to maximize the
difference between marginal benefits and costs subject to cost, weight, power,
and safety constraints. The modeling and analysis associated with the second
stage are presented in this section of the report.
B. DETERMINATION OF NET BENEFITS OF AUTOMATION BY SUBSYSTEM
Section VI discusses the various attributes and utility measures used to
assess the net benefits of automation. In this section % Section VII), it is
appropriate to relate each attribute to its respective life -cycle cost
element. Table 7-1 shows the attribute-cost relationships in terms of the
life-cycle cost variables introduced in Section V.
Because the automation cost variable is discussed in detail in
Section V, it is not addressed in this section of the report. Similarly, the
methodology frameworic in Section III assigns the crew-safety variable a
qualitative value and separates it from the other cost variables.
Table 7-1 shows that the weight and power cost variables are
respectively included in the launch support and capital costs. The cost
impact of weight reductions or increases are primarily a step function. This
means that a rather large launch constraint must be exceeded before a savings
or penalty is paid. The savings might result in launching an additional
experiment while the penalty might arise in the form of having to use a larger
booster rocket for the launch. Similarly, the power cost or savings is
expressed by either providing additional solar -array hardware or by using the
power savings to operate an additional experiment.
The crew productivity attribute is tied to several cost variables.
First, crew-training costs are potentially affected because operator-training
requirements typically decrease as more functions are automated. If the same
station crew is Employed to use the time slack for more experiments, then the
training cost may remain unaffected. The workforce ( manpower) coat is
r
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Table 7-1. Relationship between Methodology Attributes and Cost Variables
Cost Attributes Directly
Related to Man-Machine
Optimization Routine: and	 Life-Cycle Cost
Technology Ranking	 Variables Affected	 Definition
Automation life-cycle cost	 CRDp	 Research, development,
initial (IOC)	 and production cost
operating/support
Weight	 CLSTE	 Launch support and test
equipment costs
Power	 CRDp	 Same as above
Station/ground-crew 	 CTR, CMP, CTD, CF	 Training, workforce,
productivity	 Technical documenta-
tion, and ground-
facilities costs
Reliability	 CMP, CTR, CS, CM, CSTE Manpower, training,
spares, maintenance,
and support/test equip-
ment costs
Safety	 No dollar value	 Reduction in hazard-
assigned	 exposure hours
Additional Attributes
Related to Technology Life-Cycle Cost
Ranking Variables Affected Definition
Technology availability CRDp (Subjectively Reduction in hazard-
considered) exposure hours
Technology importance CRDp (Subjectively Same as above
considered)
Retrofit amenability CRDp, Cg, CM Same as above
(Subjectively
considered)
t
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directly related to productivity. This cost has three components: (1) ground
maintenance, (2) ground crew, and (3) station crew. The ground-maintenance
component will be required, regardless of the degree of automation. The
ground-crew component could be driven downwards because of the possible
reduction in ground support. The station-crew cost component will be
considered a constant, only reduced by the value of the time savings due to
automation (see Section III). The technical documentation cost element is
similar to the workforce (manpower) element in that (1) the ground-maintenance
component could remain the same or increase and (2) both ground- and
station-operational documentation could decrease as more functions are
automated. Finally, the ground facility cost variable could also experience a
reduction as ground workforce (manpower) is reduced.
Table 7-1 indicates that the reliability attribute is reflected in
several cost variables. The ground-workforce cost could be reduced by
automation as a result of inherent fault-management capability and, therefore,
lower crew involvement in the troubleshooting o f ;anomalies or faults. In the
case of the station crew, more payload time becomes available, which could be
valued in the same manner as the productivity attribute. Again, operator-
training costs could be driven lower because of the reduction of crew
involvement in fault management. On the other hand, hardware-maintenance
training and costs may increase due to the higher complexity of the equipment
and software. The last cost variable, support and test equipment, might
experience a reduction because the built-in fault-management aspect of
automation could reduce the need for duplicate ground-support equipment.
The last three attributes associated with reducing R&D risk affect three
cost variables: research and development costs, on-board spares, and
maintenance. The RED costs could reflect risk if programmatic guidelines
require that untested technology be ready by IOC. The net impact could be an
extremely high investment in research, testing, and retrofit kit design to
shorten the normal development schedule. The spares cost is potentially
increased because redundancy may be incorporated on-orbit to offset possible
lower reliabilities of newer component technology but maintain the overall
system reliability at the desired level. Similarly, the higher number of
redundant components should jointly increase the repair rate. As an overview
of the preceding discussion, Table 7-2 summarizes the expected effects of
automation on each cost variable and attribute.
Table 7-2 is not provided as an automation cost guide, but as a
departure point for the next phase of investigation. To demonstrate the
intended direction of follow-on research, consider the following set of
equations and simple example.
In the standard life-cycle cost equation from Section V:
CLC.	 CRDP. + CTR. + CM?. + CLST. + CS. + CTD. + CF. " COS.	 (7-1)
ti
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Table 7-2. Expected Subsystem Cost Impacts of Total Automation
Cost Variable
Attribute Affected Expected Cost Impact
Automation cost CRDP Increase in research, development, and
production costs
Weight CLSTE Little or no effect on Shuttle payload
capacity and resulting launch costs
Power CRDP Little or no effect on additional power
hardware requirements
Station/ground- CTR Decrease in ground and station crew operations
crew productivity training;	 little or no effect on ground-
and efficiency maintenance training
CMP Decrease in ground and station crew work-force
costs;	 little or no effect on maintenance
workforce costs
CTD	 Decrease in ground and station operations
technical documentation; possible increase
in maintenance documentation
CF	Reduction in ground facilities ( computers,
building space, etc.) commensurate with
reduction in ground workforce
Reliability CTR Decrease in ground and station crew fault-
management training;	 increase in ground-
maintenance training
CMP Decrease in ground and station crew involve-
ment in fault management
CS Decrease in on-board spare components
CM Increase in cost of maintenance due to greater
hardware / software complexity
CSTE Decrease in ground support and test equipment
due to in-place fault management
Technology CRDP Possible increase in R&D costs to make new
availability / technology available on time
importance
CS Possible increase in spares to achieve desired
system-level reliability
CM Increase in maintenance costs due to greater
number of hardw are/software failures
Retrofit CRDP Additional retrofit kit design costs to make
amenability new technology compatible with system
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let the benefit of automation be given by +b (a fractional cost-reduction or
increase factor), where now CLCB becomes the incremental life-cycle cost
benefit for automating subsystem, i; then
CLCBi s ( bRDP CRDP) i + ( b fiR C TRi )I( bMPG CMPG + bMPS CMPS) i
+	 \ +b C	 +(	 C(b	
C
LSTE LSTE)i +(bsCs)i+ (b 	 CTD TDI i	tF F)i	 (bos  Os )i
(7-2)
The difference between Equations (7-1) and (7-2) represents the revised life-
cycle cost for subsystem, i, as a result of incorporating automation. This
can be written as:
	
CLCi -
 CLCBi	 (1 - bRDP) i CRDP. + (1 - bTR/i CTR.
+ (1 - bMPG) CMp (ground) + (1 - bMPS) CMr (station)
i	 1	 \	 i.	 1
+ ( 1 - bLSTE) CLSTE.1 + ( 1 - bs1	
)i CS
1 	 1
+ ( 1
 - b TD) CTD.
1
+ (1 - bF)i
	 i
CF + (1 - bOS) COS i.	 (7-3)1	 i 
The bRDp fraction actually has two components: (1) the capital coat
component and (2) ti-e power component (i.e., a decrease in power usage could
result in a reduction in power hardware). Similarly, Equation (7-3) shows the
workforce (manpower) component divided into ground and station components. As
stated in Section V, the storage batter; example (APSM) was actually
breadboarded and tested. The net results of the APSM initial cost assessment
are shown in Table 7-3 in terms of the preceding cost-benefit variables (see
Reference 5-1).
Using Equation (7-3) and substituting in the appropriate storage battery
benefit values yields:
CLC - CLCB . CRDP + 0.5 CMp + 0.88 CLSTE + 0.5 CF
Using Voyager cost experience as an example and substituting in the
respective values for the various cost elements results in a revised initial
life-cycle cost of $7.6 million. The actual cost without APSM is calculated
to be $8.1 million. Thus, the net benefit due to automation is estimated to
be approximately 6 to 7% (see Reference 5-1). Consequently, by automating the
monitoring, verification, and fault-management functions associated with the
batteries, a net cost savings is indeed predicted.
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Table 7-3. Automated Power System Management (APSM) Battery Cost Benefits
Cost--Benefit Variable	 Fractional Benefits
Cep (Capital-cost component) 	 0 - No fractional benefit
i
Cep (Power component)	 0 - No significant savings
1 - Operator functions are totally
automated
0.5 - Reduced from k to 2 persons
1 - Unmanned platform
0 - Only a 3-lb reduction
in hardwiring
0.12
0
Ina ignif icart
0.5 - In accordance with manpower
reduction
CTR
Wt
CMp (Ground component)
CMp (Station component)
CLSTE (Weight)
CL STE (Equipment)
CS
CTD
CF
COs	 Not calculated for initial costs
BSee Equation (7-2).
Follow-on research in this area will pursue the development of benefit
curves that display the fractional cost benefit for a given cost variable as a
function of the increasing degree of automation. It is anticipated that
reasonable historical experience will be obtained from Shuttle as well as the
aerospace and auto industries.
C.	 OPTIMIZING THE MAN-MACHINE MIX
Section VI describes how the costs and benefits are calculated for a
given automation alternative and subsystem. However, station productivity and
crew safety were not included in this net-benefit cost figure. As stated in
Section VII-A, a resource-allocation approach was taken to resolve this
dilemma of conflicting multi-objectives. The multi-attribute technique,
introduced in Section III, along with an elaboration of the attributes and
supporting decision structure in Section VI, is discussed in detail in the
following paragraphs.
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1.	 Multi-Attribute Utility Theory
Multi-attribute analysis was developed to deal with complicated
decision problems for which the outcomes must be evaluated in terms of several
objectives ( also called goals or criteria). Section V' indicates that
objectives and subojectives of decision analysis must be stated in terms of
properties, either desirable or undesirable, that determine the decision-
maker ' s preferences for the outcomes. For the assessment of Space Station
automation, the four subobjectives stated in Figure 6-1 are: ( 1) minimize
cost, ( 2) maximize performance, (3) minimize technical risk, and
(4) maximise safety, The purpose of the decision analysis is to take the
subsystem man-machine alternatives or technology options, determine the degree
to which the alternatives or options satisfy each of the subobjectives, and
then establish the necessary weights for the subobjectives to arrive at a
ranking for the alternatives that accurately expresses the preferences of the
decision makers. To establish the weights of the subobjectives, a unit of
measurement must be assigned to the lowest members of the objectives
framework. Attributes are used to measure subobjectives, and they are scaled
conveniently to assess the degree to which associated subobjectives are
satisfied. The alternatives of the associated system model are expressed as
ten-component vectors, with each component corresponding to an outcome of one
of the ten attributes in Figure 6-1 [i.e., x = (xl,x2,x3,x4 , x^,x6,x7,x8 , x9+x10)
where x • is the ith attribute of the decision model). A specific outcome of
an attribute is called a state of the attribute. An "attribute state" for the
subobjective "maximize safety" might be xg - 0.1 hours of hazard exposure
per day.
a.	 Aggregating Subobjectives into a Preference Model. Once
attributes and states have been assigned to all the subobjectives, it is
necessary to aggregate the attribute states into a single unit of measurement
that accurately represents the decision maker's preference ordering of the
various states.
One common method for aggregating the attribute states is the "will-
ingness to pay" or "pricing out" technique ( see Reference 6-1). Usually, one
attribute is singled out as the key measurement attribute, preferably an
attribute quantified in dollars. Then, one at a time, each of the other
attributes are changed to a reference state, with the money state of the
measurement attribute adjusted by means of an assessed trade -off or rate of
substitution to compensate for the corresponding change in the other
attributes. Through this process, all the outcomes are expressed in terms of
n attributes, n-1 of which all have been adjusted to the same reference
attribute state. The preference ranking of the decision maker is simplified
because it is expressed by the state assigned to the measurement attribute.
Decision makers are usually interviewed separately to prevent group bias from
entering preference selections. Although easy to apply, this method is valid
with constant rates of substitution only when two conditions are satisfied:
(1)	 The set of trade -offs for the measurement attribute and any other
attribute are independent of the states of the other n-2
attributes (e.g., the decision maker provides a constant trade-off
between initial cost and productivity for all states of safety and
7-7
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reliability). This condition is not meant to imply that cost is
not a function of productivity or reliability. The condition
merely addresses the ability of an individual to make pair-wise
preferences. Indeed, consumers daily make pair-wise comparisons
in the presence of other variables (e.g., making a choice between
two brands of canned goods in the presence of other brands).
(2) The trade-offs for the measurement attribute and any other
attribute do not depend on the states of either the measurement or
other attribute (e.g., the decision maker will maintain a constant
trade-off between cost and productivity, regardless of the
magnitude of the attribute states).
Both conditioi.3 allow the analyst to substitute different trade-offs between
the measurement and other attributes (constant rate of substitution) while
ensuring validity of the decision maker's responses. In practice,
condition (1) is easy to achieve. However, decision makers do not always
respond consistently when faced with condition (2). In this case the analyst
may apprise the decision maker of the inconsistency and request
reconsideration of the response. Another approach is to use a model that
minimizes the effects of inconsistent responses. This model is the
multiplicative form of the decision analysis.
b.	 Multiplicative Model. For the formulation described in the
following paragraphs the attribute states are quantified on a numerical scale
that represents the range of preferences of the decision maker for the various
states the attribute can assume. The function that transforms an attribute
state, for a given man-machine alternative or technology option, into a
numerical representation of attribute preference is called a utility
function. The utility of the i th attribute in state xi is written as
ui(xi). The proper algebraic expression combining all the attribute
utility functions is called an outcome utility function u(x), with
(xi, ... ,xn ) being the nth-attribute outcome. An outcome utility
function is a numerical representation of the decision maker's preferences
for the outcomes. It is convenient to measure attribute utility functions on
a scale from 0.0 to 1.0, where ui = 0.0 corresponds to the least-preferred
ith attribute state that occurs among the outcomes under consideration, and
ui = 1.0 corresponds to the mos s -preferred state. The multiplicative
utility equation is shown in 	 following expression;
n
U(x) a k )HC 1 + kkiui (xi )
J
 - 1 ^.	 (7-4)
l 
where
n - number of attributes
H
= symbol for the "product" of n expressions
u(x) = outcome utility function
ui(xi) = attribute utility function of the ith attribute
ki = scaling constant ranging between 0.0 and 1.0 that determines
the "weight" or "impc-tance" of the ith attribute
k = master scaling constant that is an algebraic function of the
ki, scaling u(x) from u - 0.0 to u = 1.0.
The attributes and their measures are defined in Section VI. The
utility functions and scaling constants are determined through interviews with
the decision makers. A common technique for developing utility functions and
scaling constants is the lottery method (References 7-7 and 7-8). The lottery
method is initiated by presenting the high- and low-attribute state values to
the expert (e.g., the values could represent high- and low-cost figures for a
set of man-machine alternativ e s or technology options). Through a controlled
question-and-answer process the expert provides the intermediate data point at
which he is indifferent in his preferRnce. This point is equal to a utility
of 0.5 and represents the third data point necessary to complete the utility
plot. A similar question-and-answer process is used to establish the scaling
constant (or weight) for each attribute because the preceding overall utility
expression considers that not all attributes are equally important to the
expert.
An important consideration is the stability of preferences resulting
from multi-attribute decision analysis. First, the multiplicative model tends
to mute inconsistencies in an expert's responses. Second, the interviewer may
apprise the decision maker of preference inconsistency and request
reconsideration of the answer. On a more global level, the interviewer may
return after a set period of time and retest the same group of experts to
establish preference stability. Preference changes are usually related to
alterations in the decision-making environment, and their impacts must be
assessed at that time. These impacts would be incorporated in the alternative
rankings via sensitivity analysis (e.g., if preferences change due to this
event, then the ra nkings are affected in the following manner).
In the next subsection the battery example is used to demonstrate the
multiplicative technique. See Appendix E for a more rigorous discussion of
the multi-attribute decision theory.
2.	 Optimizing the Man-Machine Mix at the Subsystem Level
This subsection elaborates on the decision-analysis technique by
providing a practical ranking example involving the battery subsystem referred
to throughout this report. The technique used to rank the man-machine
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alternatives for the battery subsystem is the multiplicative decision model.
The same three man-machine alternatives explored earlier in the report are
used. These alternatives reflect different degrees of battery function
automation. The three alternatives, in order of increasing automation, are:
(1) Automating Verification only (AV).
(2) Automating Monitoring and Verification (AMV).
(3) Automating Fault-management, Monitoring and Verification (AFMV).
As previously indicated for the subsystem optimization of potential
man-machine alternatives, only three of the ten attributes given in Section VI
are considered: Initial cost savings in millions of dollars, crew hours saved
per mission day, and crew hours exposed to hazards per mission day. These
three attributes serve as measures for initial cost, productivity, and safety,
respe:tively.
The steps required for ranking the alternatives are as follows:
(1) Specify man-machine alternatives.
(2) EstaLlish the attributes to measure the alternatives.
(3) Obtain the attribute-state data (i.e., cost, productivity, and
hazard-exposure data).
(4) Obtain decision-maker preferences.
(5) Rank alternatives.
(6) Analyze individual rankings and elminate the least desirable
rankings.
The respective cost, productivity, and safety data for the man-machine
alternatives are shown in Table 7-4. The cost and productivity data are taken
from Table 5-4. The safety values are assumed merely for example purposes.
Note that larger values are preferred to smaller values for both initial-
cost savings and crew-hours savings while the reverse preference applies to
crew hours exposed to hazards. The ranges listed below the attribute-state
data were used to obtain an individual's possible range of preferences with
regard to the three attributes.
Three steps are usually taken to obtain an individual's preferences
using the multiplicative approach. First, a utility function is obtained for
each attribute by posing a single lottery question to the expert to establish
the three data points necessary to derive a utility curve. Next, the
at'Lribute states are ranked in order of importance to demonstrate the flow
fro the worst-possible to best-possible state. Last, the attribute scaling
con tants or weights (k i ) are obtained by posing a different set of lottery
questions to the expert to establish the relative importance of each attribute.
The utility function for initial cost savings was obtained from the
answer to the hypothetical lottery question posed in Figure 7-1, which shows
i	 j
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Table 7-4. Attribute-State Data for Battery Example
1
Attributes Safety in Crew
Productivity in	 Hours Exposed
Man-Machine Initial Cost Crew Hours to Haznrd Per
Alternative	 I Savinga, $M Saved/Mission Day	 Mission Day
Automating 0.07 0.03 0
verification
Automating monitoring 0.14 0.04 0
verification
Automating fault- 0.42 0.07 0.20
management,
monitoring and
verification
Rangesa 0 to 0.50 0 to 0.07 0 to 0.20
allsually t:e ranges for attribute states are indicated by rounded values.
Attribute: Initial Cost Savings
Sure Thing
.5M	 $0.5M
0.4
0.3
IP	 0.2
0.1
V.0	 0.0
Question: FOR WHICH VALUE OF THE "SURE TLING" ARE YOU INDIFFERENT BETWEEN THE
"SURE THING" AND THE "GAMBLE?"
Response: THE EXPERT MIGHT GIVE AN INDIFFERENCE POINT (IP) OF 0.2.
Figure 7-1. Sample Question for Obtaining a Utility Function
Gamble
or Lottery
4
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athat the individual was indifferent between a sure thing of $0.2M in initial
cost savings and a 50-50 lottery netween initial cost savings of zero or
$0.5M. Setting the utility of the most-preferred value ($0.5M) equal to 1.0,
and that of the least-preferred value (zero) equal to zero, yields the utility
of the value of indifference to the lottery. This $0.2M saved must be equal
to the expected utility of the lottery at the point of indifference, or 0.5.
The approximate utility function for initial cost savings is shown in
s	 Figure 7-2. More information concerning the lottery approach and utility
functions is provided in Appendix E.
Applying similar questions like those in Figure 7-1 allow the
productivity (in hours saved per mission day) and safety (in crew hours
exposed to hazard per mission Jay) utility functions to be plotted. These are
shown in Figures 7-3 and 7-4.
Given the three utility functions shown in Figures 7-2, 7-3, and 7-4,
one can obtain specific utilities for attribute-state values from the graphs
on the linear segments depicted therein.
The next step in obtaining individual preferences is to find the order
of importance of changes from worst to best state for the three attributes.
The format used for this lottery question is shown in Table 7-5. For the
battery example, the order of importance for the attributes is initial cost
svings safety, and productivity.
The order of importance for the attributes was used as a check on the
consistency of the scaling constants for the three attributes. As a
demonstration, the attribute scaling constants for the multiplicative model
were assumed to be 0.6 for initial cost savings, 0.2 for productivity, and 0.4
for safety. Because these do not sum to 1.0, a master scaling constant must
1.0
	 HIGHEST
UTILITY
0.8
0.6
—INDIFFERENCE POINT
0.4
0.2
0.0
LOWEST UTILITY	 0.0	 0.1	 0.2	 0.3	 0.4	 0.5(NO-AUTOMATION	 INITIAL COST SAVINGS, $M
e OPTION)
Figure 7-2. Utility Function for Initial Cost Savings
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1.0
0.8
>- 0.6
J
0.4
0.2
0.0
}
LOWEST UTILITY
HIGHEST
UTILITY
1.0
0.8
>- 0.6
INDIFFERENCE
	
0.4
	 POINT
0.2
f	 0.0
	
0.0	 0.01	 0.02	 0.03	 0.04	 0.05	 0.06	 0.07
	
LOWEST UTILITY	 CREW HOURS SAVED,/MISSION DAY(NO AUTOMATION
OPTION)
Figure 7-3. Utility Function for Productivity in Crew
Hours Saved per Mission Day
"Ir"LJrCT I IT11 IT \/
0.0	 0.1	 0.2
HOURS EXPOSED TO HAZARDS
PER MISSION DAY
Figure 7-4. Utility Function for Safety in Crew Hours
Exposed to Hazards per Mission Hay
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Table 7-5. Question to Obtain the Order of Importance of Attributes:
Which Attribute Would You Change from Its Worst
State to Its Best State First? Second?
Attributes and States
Cost	 Productivity	 Safety
t
Crew Hours	 Crew Hours
State
	
Initial Cost	 Saved per	 Exposed per
Limits	 Savings, $M	 Mission Day	 Mission Day
Best State
	
0.5	 0.07	 0.0
1
Worst State	 0.0	 0.4	 0.2
i
Order of
Importance	 1.0	 3.0	 2.0
also be determined. First, the attribute scaling constants, kl = 0.6,
k2 = 0.2, k3 = 0.4, are substituted into the multiplicative expression with
the condition that all attributes be at their preferred utility values (1),
then the overall utility u(x) is 1.0, and the multiplicative equation becomes:
n
	
u(x) = 1.0 = 1	 1 + kk. - 11
	k 	 i]
	
l i= 1 	
or	 { :j
n	 111 + k = H 1
r 1 + kk1J
i=1 1
The above equation i6 solved numerically for k = -0.47964264 (see
Reference 6-2, Vol. II, pp. B-15 to B-17 for the specific subroutine).
With the attribute and master scaling constants at hand, the next step
is to apply the attribute utility functions to the attribute state data to
obtain utilities. Using the attribute utiiity functions illustrated in
Figures 7-2, 7-3, and 7-4, the resulting attribute utilities are summarized in
Table 7-6. The no-automation option is the trivial case and is not included
in tha table.
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Table 7-6. Battery Example Attribute Utilitiesa
Attributes and Utility Data
Safety in
Initial	 Productivity	 Crew Hours
	
Cost	 in Crew Hours	 Exposed/
Savings, Utility Saved/Mission Utility Mission 	 Utility
Alternatives
	
$M	 ul(xl)	 Day	 u2(x2)	 Day	 u3(x3)
Automating
verification	 0.07	 0.1750	 0.03	 0.4286	 0	 1.0
Automating
monitoring
verification	 0.14	 0.3500	 0.04	 0.5714	 0	 1.0
Automating
fault-
management,
monitoring
and
verification	 0.42	 0.8667	 0.07	 1.000	 0.2	 0
aScaling Constant ki	 0.6	 0.2	 0.4
Master Scaling Constant k - -0.49764264.
The utilities, attribute-scaling constants, and master-scaling constant
are substituted in the multiplicative equation with the following results:
(1) For alternative AV the overall utility, considering all
attributes, is 0.5506.
(2) For alternative AMV the overall utility is 0.6528.
(3) For alternative AFMV the overall utility is 0.6701.
Thus, the ranking for the multiplicative model, with highest utility
ranked first, is:
Man-Machine Alternative	 Utility	 Rank
AFMV	 0.6701	 1
AMV	 0.6528	 2
AV	 0.5506	 3
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Examination of the attribute data for the example in Table 7-6 gives
some insights into the ranking. The AMV alternative had better initial cost
savings and better crew productivity than did the All alternative; however, AMV
and AV equal safety. Thus, the AMV must rank better than the AV system,
regardless of the model used. In decision -theory terms, the AMV alternative
dominates the AV alternative.
Comparison of the AMV attribute data with the AFMV data in Table 7-6,
shows that the AFMV alternative has better cost and crew productivity savings,
but a greater exposure to hazards. This exposure makes the AFMV's safety
attribute less preferable. With the multiplicative model and the scaling
constants of 0.6 for initial cost, 0.2 for productivity, and 0.4 for safety,
the AFMV alternative ' s utility of 0.6701 is slightly higher than that of the
AMV alternative. One could infer that the combined improvement in cost
savings and productivity slightly outweighed the loss in safety. Although the
battery example is trivial, it clearly demonstrates the subsystem alternative-
ranking exercise. At the completion of the subsystem -level analysis the best
alternatives are identified and the system -level, man-machine optimization
problem is simplified considerably.
3.	 Optimizing the Man -Machine Mix for the Total System
Once the subsystem man-machine optimization is completed, the
higher-level problem of selecting one alternative from each of the remaining
man-machine sets to maximize net present -value benefits needs to be solved.
Accordingly, let a be the total number of subsystems and let Ak ` akl , — ^akt
be the reduced set of man -machine alternatives correspondingly derived. The
overall problem has two solutions, depending on whether productivity has a
dollar value:
First, if productivity does not have a dollar value assigned, then the
equation takes the following form:
i
j
n m
Asa 1111 M k t(akt))
,a
	 t=1
subject to
n m
11 E Ckt (akt ) < CT
k=1 t=1
where
(7-S)
(7-6)
akt = identified man-machine alternative, t, for a given subsystem, k
Mkt = crew manhour (workhour) savings associated with a given man-
machine a l ternative, t, for a given subsystem, k
Ckt = net subsystem, k, cost considering the benefit of automating
alternative, t
CT = cost target for the total system
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In formulating this problem, it is assumed that the objective and
constraint functions are linear. This assumption is aot absolutely necessary,
but it simplifies the problem. It is also assumed that there are no
interrelationships between the possible alternatives. Finally, it is resumed
that the decisicn variables (a) have discrete values and that the parameters
of the model are known with reasonable certainty. The last "parameter"
aasumption is not unreasonable in light of the supporting data and analysis
provided throughout the methodology.
A slightly different formulation is obtained when a dollar value is
assigned for productivity as shown in the following equations and ensuing
discussion:
n m
max EE  Bkt (akt(7-7)A,ak-1 t-1
subject to
n m
(Ckt - Bkt f ( akt ) < CT 	(7-8)
k-1 t-1
n m
	
EE Wkt ( akt ) < WT 	(7-9)
k-1 t-1
n m
	
Pkt (akt) 5 PT	 (7-10)
k-1 t-1
n m
lct (akt ) - 0	 (7-11)
k= 1 t-1
m
Ea kt 0 1, k-1, t = 1, ... ,m	 (7-12)
t-1
in which
akt > 0	 all k, all n
y
i
i t
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where
Bkt - net benefit from automating subsystem, k, with alternative, t.
This net benefit is made up of the benefit from manhours saved,
Mkt , and other incremental net dollar benefits, ck t , [i.e., Bkt
is (Mkt + ckt)]
Ckt - net subsystem, k, cost not considering the benefit of
automating alternative, t
CT i cost target for the total system
Wkt - incremental weight impact of automating subsystem, k, with
alternative, t
Pkt = incremental power impact of automating subsystem, k, with
alternative, t
WT - system-level weight constraint
PT - system-level power constraint
Hkt = incremental hazard exposure time reduction due to automating
subsystem, k, with alternative, t
akt - identified man-machine alternative, t, for a given
su p system, k
Equations ( 7-5) and ( 7-6) basically stipulate that crew workhours (man-
hours) saved be maximized subject to the constraint that the cost of a given
subsystem ( less the net cost-benefits) not exceed a set cost t..-get. In the
case where a monetary value for productivity exists, the major constraint
Equation ( 7-8) states that the total monetary outlay for Space Station design,
development, test, and evaluation, minus the estimated value of the time saved
(both on-orbit and on the ground) and net benefits, cannot exceed the amount
of money (CT) allocated as tiie cost target for the launch date.
Constraints ( 7-9) and ( 7-10), respectively, limit the weight and power of the
full configuration with automation incorporated. Each of the coefficients on
the left-hand sidi is written as a function of all the decision variables.
Constraint ( 7--11) references the taseline design and stipulates that the total
exposure time in hazardous environments must not increase, while
Equation ( 7-12) requires that only one alternative be chosen for each
subsystem.
In sum, the objective of Equation ( 7- • 7) is to maximize the benefits of
automation to the Space Station over the lifetime of the vehicle. It is
understood that it could take a number of years before the program begins to
pay for itself. Therefore, to view this situation from the proper
perspective, cne approach is to convert the measure "time saved through
automation" to an equivalent dollar value by parametric solution. Similarly,
because it is unlikely that the required cost target w-.11 be known with
certainty, the corresponding term, CT, can also be treated parametrically
and the problem solved for a range of values. At a minimum, this analysis
I
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will provide an imputed dollar figure for CT
 or M; that is, it will
establish what a viable cost target, or unit of time in space, should be
worth, based on projected costs and savings. Of course, this approach is only
temporary until an actual cost target and productivity value are established.
Because the man-machine alternatives have been pared down by the
"efficient subset" and subsystem "decision analysis" routines, the
maximization problem is translatable into a fairly small linear program that
is solvable with either the branch and bound technique or the simplex method
algorithm (Reference 7-11). The branch and bound technique begins by
obtaining a bound on the objective function by suppressing the dependencies at
the system level, i. e., by fixing the values in Equations (7-7) through
(7-10) at their upper values and solving the resultant integer linear
program. Next, the branch and bound technique requires that the set of all
feasible solutions (i.e., in this case, man-machine alternatives) first be
partitioned into several subsets. Because the objective in the previous cost
and productivity equation is to maximize workhours (manhours) saved and net
benefits without exceeding a cost ceiling, any subset of alternatives that
surpasses the cost ceiling is excluded. The remaining subsets are then
partitioned further and examined in the same fashion. This process is
repeated until a feasible solution is found so that the upper bound of the
last subset satisfies the objective function. Such a feasible solution must
be optimal because none of the subsets can provide a better solution. This
approach facilitates programming of the model. It is possible that no subset
meets the objective function. In this event, the next step is merely to
select the subsets that minimize the difference between the cost target and
Loper bound on each subset of man-machine alternatives.
The second solution technique, the simplex method, uses an efficient
algorithm for solving linear programming problems. In this method the
constraint inequalities are first converted to equalities by introducing slack
variables. The resultant system of simultaneous equations is solved
repeatedly for sets of basic feasible solutions with each one better than the
previous one. The process goes on until an optimal solution is reached. An
optimal solution is a feasible solution that has the most favorable value for
Equation (7-7). In this application the optimal solution would be the
system-wide, man-machine alternative subset that exhibits the maximum benefit
in workhours (manhours) saved and cost savings, while satisfying the system-
level constraints.
D.	 DETERMINATION OF BEST TECHNOLOGY GROWTH PATH
The previous subsections demonstrate the use of multi-attribute decision
analysis to further trim the subsets of man-machine alternatives associated
with each subsystem, followed by an overall system-level optimization. The
intent of exercising the decision analysis for the subsystem optimization
scheme is to make the final system-level solution as efficient and simple as
possible (i.e., to reduce the number of equations and variables to a level
manageable by a small, desktop computer). Once the optimal man-machine
alternatives have beer. selected for the complete system, the final step in the
methodology is to plot the beat technology incorporation plan for out-year
station growth. This plan might require new technology to further automate
crew functions as a move towards greater station autonom; or to meet distinct
mission demands.
t
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The earlier application of multi-attrbute decision analysis
concentrated on only three attributes: (1) net initial cost savings,
(2) crew productivity (in workhour savings), and (3) safety (in net reduction
to hazards). In ordering the various technologies, the complete range of ten
attributes must be considered. Figure 6-1 graphically depicts the total range
of attributes required to solve the multi-attribute decision problem
associated with technology rankings. The complete list of attributes is as
followa:
(1) IOC cost (19841).
(2) Life-cycle cost (1980).
(3) Weight (kilograms).
(4) Power consumption (kilowatts).
(S) Station/ground-crew productivity (manhour savings).
(6) Reliability (hours per day).
(7) Technology importance to out-year missions (subjective value).
(8) Technology availability (years beyond IOC).
(9) Retrofit amenability (subjective value).
(10)	 Safety (hours exposed to hazards per day).
i
As with the man-machine alternatives problem, the technology
alternatives arP	 (1) first specified by subsystem, 	 (2) the attributes are
established and defined in terms of their respective states, followed by
(3) a determination of individual preferences for certain technologies that
ultimately leads to the technology ranking. 	 Although a thorough assessment of
technology options will be the subject of subsequent research, this analysis x
will undoubtedly begin with the likely Space Station technologies identified
by the Space Station Advanced Technology Advisory Commission (ATAC) Y
(Reference 7-12).	 Table 7-7 lists the primary technologies that will be N.
studied during the next research phase. 	 Attribute stares will need to be
developed for each set of technologies associated with various station
subsystems (e.g., projected costs, additional workhour savings, and projected
availability times).	 Although the decision analysis is complicated by the
larger array cf attributes, the technology ranking problem is somewhat
simplified because many technologies apply to several different subsystems.
Several significant results have surfaced in cloning this first phase of
the man-machine trade-off analysis effort. 	 First, and most important, the
overall objective of developing a methodology to assess man-machine automation
trade-offs and technology options for spacecraft (and specifically Space
Station) was achieved.	 This result carries considerable weight because the
early literature search revealed 	 (1) no apparent system-level method for
assessing benefits and penalties of spacecraft automation and 	 (2) no
well-defined technique for prioritizing, and planning incorporation of,
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Table 7-7. List of Potential Space Station Technologies
Generic	 Applicable	 Area of
Function	 Technology	 Application	 Application
Maintenance/repair
Station
Payloads
Construction/
assembly
Sensing	 Sensors	 Inspection
Vision
Tactile	 Cleaning
Proximity
Force/torque	 Reconfiguration
Position/velocity
Manipulation for
Smart sensors	 task execution
Sensor fusion	 Orientation for task
execution
3-D vision
round orbit: all
activities
requiring
operator/machine-
control interface
Input/Output	 Character Operator/station
recognition communication
Voice recognition
Voice synthesis
Speech under-
standing
Language repre-
sentation
Natural language
Touch input devices
Color graphics Scene analysis
Heads-up displays Dynamic scene
simulation
Holographic
displays
s
!	 Data	 Optical data Short-term archiving
Storage	 storage devices
Procedures rezerences
Magnetic bubble
storage Activities/events logs
1
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Table 7-7. (Cont'd)
Genric	 Applicable	 Area of
Function	 Techntlogy
	
Application	 Application
Artificial	 Expert systems
Intelligence
Advisory knowledge
base systems
Analogical reason-
ing
Mpnotonic reasoning
Nonmonotonic
reasoning
Heuristic search
Knowledge repre-
sentation
Automatic learning
Adaptive database
management
Self-adaptive
control
Planning
Path/trajectory
Tracking/control
Traffic
iL S
Resource utilization
Service tasks
Maintenance
management
Subsystem
management
Mission profile
optimization
System/subsystem test
Constraint monitoring
Fault detection
Anomaly analysis
Fault correction
Operations
Planning/
scheduling:
Gnd-based
On-orbit
Housekeeping
System verification
acceptance
Fault management
Maintenance planning/
modification
Productivity/
scheduling impact
assessment
Station and free flier Stationkeeping
information control
Free flier approach
control
Proximity operations
Momentum management
Orbit maintenance
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Table 7-7. (Cont'd)
Genric
Function
Applicable
Technology Application
Area of
Application
Artificial Supervisory control Process control Payloads
Intelligence Expert process
controllers
Expert mainte-
nance con-
trollers
Remote Teleoperation /tele- Equipment handling Station
Operation presence Assembly/
Berthing, securing construction
Dexterous arm
Unit changeout Service /repair
Dual arm
coordinator Visual inspection Payload/free flier
Installation
Multi-system Propellant / fluid Operation
coordinator transfer Reconfigsration
Gross manipulator Handling
Small loads
Small clearance
Tool manipulation
Stowage
Fault Fault-tolerant All data handling and
Tolerance Architecture processing
Data transfer
Storage
Processors
Software
Software Operating system Application software Operations control
Control Ground Orbit
Procedure -oriented Control algorithms Station
languages Payloads
Free fliers
Platforms
i^..i
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advanced automation technologies. In terms of developing tools to aid the
design and planning of spacecraft systems to be flexible for future growth and
built within budget constraints, this methodology clearly represents a
keystone in that development process.
The next major result was that a large amount of knowledge was obtained
in the process of building the methodology. For example, the problem of
deciding what to automate and what not to automate is a complex combination of
crew task, design, and cost variables interlaced with consideration of several
competing program objectives (e.g., budget, safety, and schedule
constraints). Indeed, the approach presented in this report respects the
complexity of the problem by incorporating four distinct, but integrated,
modeling techniques in the solution framework (i.e., functional networking,
conceptual-design and cost-benefit assessment, multi-attribute decision
analysis, and system optimization).
The third significant result was the definition of major spacecraft
design drivers. Although spacecraft experts have been aware of the design
drivers for some time, the importance of this result revolves around the
development of a decision framework that integrates both quantitative and
qualitative measures of the drivers. A strong decision-making foundation was
provided through multi-attribute utility theory. This technique will prove to
be a valuable tool for solving the technology-ranking problem in ensuing study
phases.
The last major result was that the practicality of the methodology was
able to be demonstrated on a simple example. This demonstration was
accomplished with the storage-battery subsystem. Other results of this
research phase are elaborated on in Section VIII.
t
i
z
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SECTION VIII
RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. OVERVIEW
This study establishes an analytical framework for assessing both
man-machine mix trade-offs and advanced automation technology options, as
related to Space Station. This initial feasibility and methodology design
investigation provides an understanding of strengths and weaknesses within the
framework and supporting database. Some of the problem areas are discussed
separately as each aspect of the methodology is developed. In closing, the
rfollowing paragraphs summarize the results of the study and problem areas
encountered from this initial study phase. Additionally, recommendations are
provided for follow-on research.
B. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Table 8-1 summarizes the results of the Phase I automation trade-off
assessment. The methodology was judged "good" in the areas of functional task
networks and database support. This assessment was based on the clear
existence of manned-spacecraft operational logs, actual astronaut experience,
and reasonable availability of cost and logistical support experience. One
follow-on goal for these areas is to investigate whether greater granularity
can be achieved in the task and reliability data.
From an input data standpoint, it seems that the productivity and design
assessment, as well as supporting cost inputs, are fairly in-line with the
estimates resulting from models such as PRC.
The conceptual design examples provided in this report strongly indicate
that it is feasible to develop conceptual designs and costs for automation.
However, while the supporting cost and productivity attributes can be clearly
defined, most of the remaining attributes cannot yet be concisely quantified.
Similarly, without a value for crew productivity time, the man-machine and
technology optimization (or prioritization) techniques, although reasonable,
are still incomplete.
One strength that the technique demonstrates is the ability to draw on,
or incorporate, several different automation and costing studies under one
trade-off framework. This aspect of the methodology is strongly addressed in
Section II.
Finally, in the last category (actually applying the technique), it is
unclear at this stage of research whether or not the technique will be able to
be exercised on subsystems other than the battery example. This uncertainty
primarily revolves around the attribute quantification problem addressed above.
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Table 8-1. Space Station Man-Machine Trade-off Findings
Results in Terms of Data
Availability/Quality
Unknown at
Methodology Area 	 Good	 Reasonable	 this Stage
Technique demonstrates cap- 	 X
ability to develop represent-
ative crew functional task
networks
Data-base development to X
support technique seems
feasible
Methodology data input /output X X
accuracy appears to be at Input Output
equivalent to present concept-
ual design costing bases
Technique demonstrates cap- X
ability to provide reasonable
automation conceptual design
confinration /cost estimates
Technique demonstrates ability X
to identify and characterize
key design attributes
Technique demonstrates ability X	 X
to quantify discretely all Cost,	 Remaining
design attributes Productivity	 attributes
Technique exhibits a strong X
approach for prioritizing
man-machine and technology
options
Technique exhibits strong X
synergism with other related
automation and costing
studies such as ARAMIS, THURIS,
and the PRC cost model
Technique fully demonstrated on X	 X
actual subsystem Battery example	 Actual Space
Station sub-
systems
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C.	 RECOMMENDATIONS
In summarizing this first stage of the man-machine automation trade-off
research, the following prioritized list of follow-on study areas is provided
to assist in establishing a plan for the next stage of methodology development.
(1) Database Development.
(a) Explore and define more thoroughly life-cycle cost variables
and their relationships to varying degrees of automation.
(b) Continue to tap other associated databases for supporting
input data (e.g., THURIS, PRC, Langley database).
(c) Examine task time-line databases to expand ground and
station functional networks (for other functions and
modules).
(d) Pursue a value of crew time saved.
(e) Initiate the methodology software design/development.
(2)	 Applications.
(a) Continue developing automation examples and supporting
conceptual designs.
(b) Demonstrate the complete technique on more subsystems.
(3) Methodology Design.}
(a) Solidify the multi-attribute decision and weighting criteria.
(b) Further quantify attributes and develop the supporting
database.	 i
(4)	 Human-Machine Functional Allocation.
S
(a) Explore all human-factor aspects of functional allocation
problem (e.g., motivational, psychological, etc.).
(b) Revise functional allocation criteria to incorporate
complete scope of human-factor variables.
(c) Develop weighting criteria for functional allocation
criteria.
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APPENDIX C
PAYLOADS ON IOC CO-ORBITER AND POLAR PLATFORMS
Table C-1 describes payloads on-board the Co-Orbiter Platform during the
years 1991 to 1993. The service -interval data are extracted from the Mission
Requirements Working Group (MRWG), Langley Database, March 30, 1984 version.
Table C-2 describes payloads on-board the Polar Platform during the
years 1991 and 1993. The service-interval data are extracted from the MRWG,
Langley Database, March 30, 1984 version.
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APPENDIX D
AUTOMATION OF RENDEZVOUS AND DOCKING FUNCTIONS
There are several possible rendezvous and docking (henceforth denoted by
the acronym REND) scenarios in unmanned platform operations to consider as a
model for functional breakout. These scenarios are:
(1) STS RENDa with the platform (both polar and co-orbiting).
(2) Co-orbiting platform RENDS with the Space Station.
(3) OMV RENDs with the platform (both polar and co-orbiting).
For the purposes of the discussion that follows, Scenario (3) is chosen
(primarily to support the generation of inputs to a ground-crew operation
versus on-board operations trade).
A REND can be divided into three basic phases of operation:
(1) Rendezvous. Operations from the OMV parking orbit or OMV station
(at the Space Station or STS) to within a 1-km "box," representing
the vicinity of the target vehicle (i.e., an unmanned platform).
(2) Terminal Rendezvous. Operations of the OMV and target vehicle
within the 1-km "box" until the OMV makes physical contact with
the target vehicle (including 	 contact with an appendage, such
as a berthine mechanism)
(3) Docking/ Berthing. Operations of the OMV and target vehicle from
the moment of physical contact until the two can be considered a
new configuration of the target vehicle.
The following functional breakout is performed for each of these three
phases of the REND operation. The focus is primarily the unmanned platform
functions in each phase except for rendezvous. Assumptions on the REND
operation are:
(1) OMV performs rendezvous, using the target vehicle position
telemetered from the ground station. The OMV performs on-board
trajectory and navigation updates to a planned rendezvous sequence.
(2) Upon completion of a successful rendezvous, the OMV will be
commanded (by ground station or target vehicle) to maintain a
station within the rendezvous "box." The OMV remains on station
until terminal rendezvous commences.
(3) The target vehicle will be "passive" during the terminal
rendezvous with the OMV. However, the target vehicle will perform
traffic control, guiding the OMV to the docking port or berthing
apparatus.
(4) The OMV receives commands and transmits telemetry directly to the
target vehicle during the terminal rendezvous operation.
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kI.	 RENDEZVOUS FUNCTIONS
A.	 Planning: Initial Trajectory Computation
1. Rendezvous timing parameters
2. Target vehicle orbit and OMV orbit input parameters
B.	 Orbit Transfer: Execution
1.	 Control
a. Thrust vector alignment
b. Attitude control
2.	 Guidance
a. Update/optimization of trajectory computation
b. Update propellant usage profile
3.	 Navigation
a. Compute update to OMV orbit
b. Target orbit achievement assessment
4.	 Communication (through TDRSS) and Tracking (through GPS)
a. Telemetry and audit trail transmission to ground
b. Command receipt from ground updating target vehicle
position
C.	 Receipt of signals from GPS
S.	 Propulsion
a. Propellant remaining
b. Center of mass drift
C.	 Orbit Trim: Stationkeeping
1.	 Control
a. Orbit correction
b. Translational control
C.
	
Attitude control
D-2
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II.
2.	 Navigation
a. Orbit parameter computation
b. Relative position to target ^ehicle determination
C.	 Stationkeeping translational command generation
3.	 Communication and Tracking
a. Telemetry and audit trail transmission to the ground
b. Receipt of stationkeeping commands from target vehicle
C.	 Command receipt from the ground
d.	 Signal receipt from GPS
TERMINAL RENDEZVOUS FUNCTIONS
A.	 Planning
1.	 Communication and Tracking
a. OMV acquisition
b. Ranging by target vehicle of OMV
C.	 Signal receipt from GPS
d.	 Command/data receipt from ground stations
2.	 Navigation: Orbit parameter computation
3.	 Traffic Control
a. Generation of approach corridor for OMV: Command
sequence
b. Generation of collision avoidance command sequence
4.	 Payload Control
a. Cage or shuttering of instruments
b. Control gain reset for docking/berthing disturbances
5.	 Attitude Control
a. Control law selection for docking/berthing
disturban.:Ps (e.g., use of manipulators)
b. Sensor complement readiness (e.g., gyros,
accelerometer turned on/readied)
f
Y^
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C.
	 Update of fault protection
d. Caging/damping selection for arrays, antennas
e. Thruster selection
6.	 Manipulators
a.	 Uncaged and commanded to berthing position
- b.	 OMV model selection for acquisition
7. Propulsion:	 Thruster and tank-usage selection
B.	 Commanded Translation of OMV
1.
3
Communication and Tracking
a.	 Transmission to OMV of:
(1)	 Collision avoidance commands
(2)	 Translational/attitude commands
b.	 Receipt of OMV telemetry:	 attitude and axial rates,
status
C.	 Ranging for OMV translational position, rate
d.	 Telemetry and audit trail transmissions to ground
station
2. Traffic Control
a.	 Update to approach trajectory: 	 command generation of
translation, approach rates and OMV attitude, attitude
rates
b.	 Update to collision avoidance: 	 command generation
3. Manipulators
a.	 OMV acquisition
b.	 Synchronization of manipulator motion with OMV
attitude and rates
BERTHING FUNCTIONS
A.	 Initiation
-	 1. Traffic Control
a.	 Determines OMV within berthing cone
t
t
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b.-	 Generates command for OMV to station keep within the
berthing cone
2.	 Manipulators
a. Receive.command (from on —board executive) to berth the
OMV
b. Positions end effector for attachment to OMV
B.	 Attachment
1. Communication and Tracking
a.	 Transmits command to OMV to suppress attitude control
b.	 Receives OMV telemetry
C.	 Transmits telemetry to ground station
2. Manipulators
a.	 Attaches manipulator to OMV
b.	 Performs residual rate control and disturbance
suppression of berthed manipulator/OMV configuration
3. Attitude Control
i
a.	 Control OMV and manipulator induced rates and
disturbances with combined use of thrusters and MEDs	 i
b.	 Senses disturbances using gyros and accelerometers
IV.	 DOCKING FUNCTIONS	 i
A.	 Initiation
1. Traffic Control
a.	 Determines then OMV (or attached OMV/manipulator) is
within cone of docking port
b.	 Generates commands for OMV to perform translation to
docking port at a given rate of approach, to achieve a
given attitude, to reduce attitude rates
2. Manipulators:
	 In case of OMV/manipulator berthed
configuration
a.	 Generates approach sequence to position OMV at the
docking port
4..D-5
ti
b.	 Selects/updates control law for manipulator/OMV
configuration
B.	 Attachment
W.
1. Traffic Control:	 Commands OMV contact with the docking port
2. Communication and Tracking
A. Transmits command to OMV to perform contact and
suppress attitude control
b. Receives OMV telemetry
C. Transmits telemetry to ground station
3. Manipulators:	 Performs attachment of OMV to the docking port
4. Attitude Control
a. Controls OMV and manipulator induced rates and
disturbances with combined use of thrusters and MEDs
b. Senses disturbances using gyros and accelerometers
C. Attenuates the docking disturbances
d. Determines new mass/inertia of combined systems and
updates control laws
5. Power and Thermal Control
a. Provides power and accepts the thermal load of the
docked OMV
b. Perform grounding and static discharge of the docked
OMV
6. Data: Provide direct communication link with the docked OMV
D-6
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VAPPENDIX E
DETAILED DISCUSSION OF MULTI-ATTRIBUTE DECISION THEORY
This Appendix expands the multi-attribute decision theory discussed in
Section VII, which summarized the multiplicative utility model and included a
supporting example to demonstrate how alternatives are ranked, based on
decision makers' preferences. The following paragraphs provide a more
detailed theoretical foundation for the multiplicative model and a means of
verifying results.
The formulation described in the following paragraphs quantifies
attribute states on a numerical scale that represents the preferences of the
decision maker for the various states that the attribute can assume. The
function that transforms an attribute state into a numerical representation of
attribute preference is called an attribute utility function. It is
represented by the expression ui(xi), the attribute utility function value
for the ith attribute in the attribute state xi. The proven algebraic
expression combining the attribute utility functions is called an outcome
utility function u(x), with (xl, ... ,xn) being the n-attribute outcome.
An outcome utility function is a numerical representation of the decision
maker's preferences for the outcomes. The use of the word "utility" to
represent preference or value has a rich and venerable history in economics.
It is convenient to measure attribute utility functions on a scale from 0.0 to
1.0, where ui s 0.0 corresponds to the least-preferred ith attribute state
that occurs among the outcomes under consideration, and ui a 1.0 corresponds
to the most-preferred state. A hypothetical utility function for station
power (attribute x4 of Figure 6-1) might be as shown in Figure E-1. Note
that, because u4(x4) - 40 - 0.5 in Figure E-1, one could interpret this as
meaning that the decision maker has the same preference in decreasing power
consumption from 50 to 40 kW as decreasing power cons,.nption from 40 to 10 W.
If all the other attributes of an outcome are held at constant states,
it is theoretically possible to construct an attribute utility function as
shown in Figure E-1. 'There are several techniques for determining the form of
the attribute utility function. 'these include direct-magnitude estimation,
preference-difference assessments (either rank ordering of preference
differences or equal preference-interval scaling), ratio scaling, and the
lottery method (References 7-7 and 7-8). The lottery method is recommended
because of its simplicity, theoretical consistency, its widespread discussion
in the literature, and the fact that it provides a straightforward way of
handling uncertainty. Figure E-2 illustrates a question that might be asked
to obtain utility function values using a lottery or gamble technique.
If the other attributes are not held at constant states then the concept
of an attribute utility function has no theoretical or practical validity
unless certain independence conditions are satisfied. The most obvious
independence condition is that the form of the attribute utility function
should not change if the other attributes are held at constant, but different,
attribute states. This independence condition allows the concept of an
attribute utility function to be meaningful. The name given to this type of
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Figure E-1. Typical Attribute Utility Function
attribute independence is utility independence. In other words, the responses
to questions posed to obtain a utility function for power consumption should
not change if the levels of the other attributes such as weight or initial
cost change.
If the attributes satisfy utility independence, then the utility of the
outcomes can be computed as a weighted sum of the attribute utilities, e.g.,
where x - (xl,x2),
u(x) - klul(xl) + k2u2(x2)
Unfortunately, utility independence of the attributes alone does not suffice
mathematically to ensure that the outcome utilities can be correctly computed
as the weighted sum of the attribute utilities. Keeney and Raiffa (see
Reference 6-1) show that for the two-attribute case, x - (xl,x2), the
correct formula, assuming utility independence, is actually:
u(x) - klul (xl) + k2u2 (x2) + (1 - kl - k 2 ) ul (xl) u2(x2)
The established mathematical derivation shows the presence of a multiplica-
tive term ul(xl) u2(x2) with a weighting factor of (1 - kl - k2).
x
r
i
F ^ .
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JA
Gamble
Attribute: Power Consumption
Sure Thing
0 kW (Utility - 0.0)
(State-of-the-art Technology)	 50 kW
40
OR
	
30
IP	 1	 20
0.10 kW (Utility - 1.0)
	
10 kW
(Target Technology)
Question: CHOOSE A VALUE OF THE "SURE THING" FOR WHICH YOU ARE INDIFFERENT
BETWEEN THE "SURE THING" AND THE "GAMBLE."
Response: EXAMPLE INDIFFERENCE POINT 20 kW.
(THE RESPONSE TO THIS QUESTION YIELDS THE "SURE THING" VALUE FOR POWER
CONSUMPTION THAT HAS A UTILITY OF 0.5.)
Figure E-2. Illustration of a Lottery to Obtain Utility Function Values
A simple example can illustrate why the weighted sum can yield incorrect
orderings of outcome preference. Consider the selection of an aircraft with
the two attributes of concern being xl - payload weight and x2 - aircraft
range. A weighted sum could incorrectly give preferential ranking to an
aircraft with a very large payload weight [where k l - 1 and u l (x l ) - 0.8], but
whose range was less than the majority of the routes being considered [where
k2 - 1 and u2 (x2 ) - 0.21. In this case, u(x) - 0.84 and would, therefore,
rate this aircraft alternative rather high as a preference even though the
utility of "short" range (0.2) is low.
To prevent inaccurate results such as the above example, Keeney (see
Reference 6-1) has developed a practical algebraic expression for combining
the attribute utility functions to obtain an outcome utility function. Rather
than testing each attribute for utility independence, Keeney has shown that it
is only necessary to test one attribute for utility independence (call it the
reference attribute) and then to verify that the pair-wise trade-offs of the
reference attribute versus each of the other n-1 attributes are independent of
the states of the remaining n-2 attributes. This pair-wise trade-off
independence is called preferential independence and is not difficult to
E-3
verify in practice. To illustrate this concept, consider the trade-off
between initial cost and power consumption. For preferential independence to
hold, this trade-off would have to be independent of the states of the six
other attributes shown in Figure 6-1 of the report. 'these n independence
conditions (one utility independence and n-1 preferential independence) then
lead to an algebraic expression for the outcome utility function of the form:
n r
u(x) - k ' H
l	 C1
1 i-1
where:
+ kk.u.(x.) - 1'
n - number of attributes
u(x) - outcome utility function
ui(xi) - attribute utility function of the ith attribute
ki - scaling constant ranging between 0.0 and 1.0 that
determines the "weight" or "importance" of the ith
attribute
k - master scaling constant that is an algebraic function of the
ki, scaling u(x) from u - 0.0 to u - 1.0
-or the details of the proof, see Reference 6-1. This utility function will
henceforth be called the multiplicative function or multiplicative model.
The n scaling constants, ki, determine the relative importance of the
associated attributes. The range for k values is from 0 . 0 to 1 . 0, with the
larger values associated with the more important attributes. If the n ki's
sum to 1.0, then the multiplicative model simplifies to the add:.tive model. 	 F
4L _r
When the necessary independence conditions are violated, it is possible
to divide the attribute -state ranges into intervals over which the indepen-
dence conditions are approximately valid, or the set of attributes can be
redefined so the independence conditions are valid. It is important to
distinguish these independence conditions from the "technical dependence" of
variables that define the system model. This latter type of dependence arises
naturally in engineering systems and only restricts the set of feasible states
of the system model. In the aircraft example cited earlier, the engineering
constraints on the design of the aircraft result in a technical dependence (or
functional relationship) between aircraft range and payload weight_.
 It must
be stressed that this "technic-al dependence" has no effect on the value
model. Preferential independence conditions required of the multiplicative
formulation address the ability of a decision maker to make a pair
- wisee trade-
off between two attributes in the presence of other attribute states. As
shown in Section VII-B-la, consumers practice pair -wise trade-offs in the
presence of other attributes on a daily basis.
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Use of the multiplicative model has on occasion raised the issue that
the model is difficult to understand and that it is opaque. The term opaque
here indicates that it is cumbersome to follow the calculations and to see how
such impact a change in an attribute state value, or scaling constant, has on
the overall utility of an alternative. One might also note that this opacity
concomitantly carries a benefit of reducing the impacts of an individual who
is hiding true preferences to influence the ranking results or who is not
totally consistent in forming preferences.
The difficulty of the calculations required by the multiplicative model
raises doubts in an audience seeing a ranking based on this model. If one
alternative is ranked higher than another, a normal set of audience questions
includes "Why?" and "How much higher?"
A utility function that features transparency and yields audience
understanding of its resultant ranking is the additive .:v4ction mentioned
earlier:
n
U(X)	 kiui(xi)
where
u(x) - outcome utility function
ui(xi) - attribute utility function of the ith attribute
ki a scaling constant ranging between 0.0 and 1.0 that
determines the "weight" or "importance" of the ith attribute
n s number of attributes
The additive model does, however, require a more restrictive
independence condition than the multi plicative form. This condition is
additive independence. Additive independence for attributes xl, x2, ... ,xn,
applies "if the preference order for lotteries does not depend on the joint
probability distribution of these lotteries, but rather depends only on their
marginal probability distributions."
To illustrate additive independence, consider lotteries Ll and L2 ss
shown in Figure E-3. lottery Ll yields equal (0.5) chance at the
consequences (xo ,y') and (x',yo ). Note that both lotteries have an equal
(0.5) chance at either xo or x', and also that both have an equal (0.5)
chance at yo and y'. By definition, than, the marginal probability
distributions on both the attributes X and Y are the same. If X and Y are
additively independent, one must be indifferent between lotteries Ll and
L2 . This same indifference condition must hold if either or both x' and y'
re changed in Figure E-3 because Ll and L2 would still have the same
marginal probability distributions on the two attributes (see Reference 7-10).
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x 1 9 y1)
x, y')
X "
 y )
L1= L2
Figure E-3. Lotteries to Illustrate Additive Independence
For n attributes, the additive utility function exists if and only if
all attribute pairs are additively independent. Often, additive independence
of all pairs of attributes does not hold in practice.
At this point, one is faced with a dilemma: One could use the additive
model, which is easier to understand but which is less rigorous because the
required additive independence conditions are less likely to hold.
Alternatively, one could use the multiplicative model, which is more rigorous
because the required utility and preferential independence conditions are more
likely to be verifiable but which is more difficult to understand.
One solution to this dilemma is to use both the multiplicative and
additive models to prepare sets of rankings. If one gathers the utility
functioi:s and scaling constants for the multiplicative model, the scaling
constants can be normalized to sum to 1.0 and used in the additive model.
Microcomputer programs to accomplish this are alr3ady available. For example,
see Appendix B in Volume II of Reference 6-2. Thus, the additional effort to
determine rankings u® 4 ng both the additive and multiplicative models is quite
small.
A legitimate concern regarding the use of both utility models is that
the resulting rankings may differ significantly. If this is a concern, then
the analyst should use the multiplicative form because of its rigor. In
practice, however, differences between rankings from multiplicative and
additive wodels do not seem to be statistically significant. For example,
Feinberg, et al. found few differences between rankings produced by the two
models for 39 individuals for 10 alternative advanced-vehicle technologies.
The resolution of when to choose one form of utility model over the other, or
whether a choice is necessary, will continue to be explored as more decision
applications are completed.
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